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PllFACI 
International relation• prior to 1900 had been lf.aitad to the con• 
tinenta of lurope and America. !urope in particular had controlled Aaia 
and Africa, making them aubeervient and wholly dependent politically, 
economically, and aocially to it. Thia waa .. de poaaible by a mutual 
underatancliq between the dominant powara. However, after World War II, 
The Third World, coapriaiq thoae n.atiOGa created after 1945, baa achieved 
a proainent place in international relation•. lt haa penetrated world 
politica. 
Thia analyaia i• not a atudy of the Third World, but rather it 
will be an analyaia of the balance of power politic• iD relatiooa to 
ailitary interveation. It will center it• atud7 in the Y...n conflict, 
which atarted in 26 September 1962, and in which it had it• root• dating 
before that. The aurvey will concentrate on the Civil War in Yemen, 
••••••ina the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian iuvolv...ata in the diepute, aod 
.. aauring the effect it haa hacl on their relation• aa well •• on the 
balance of power in the Middle Eaat. Further, it will apeculate on the 
effect the conflict haa had in ariaing the intereat, negative or poaitive, 
of the big powere. It will esaaine how the political and military •tale• 
mate between the tvo Super Powers haa altered world politic• la regard• 
ailitary intervention. Military iatenention vaa at one tille at the di•· 
poeal of the bi& povera. who enjoyed it, and at tlaea, practiced it 1ndia• 
crillinately. 
11 
The atudy 1• belDg unclertakem prillarlly becauae th• Y...n prob• 
1- baa, 11e>re or l•••• been ipored by the world. Little baa bea vrittn 
about it. It 1• vital that 110r• 11\fomatioo be Md• kDown, becaua• tb• 
Yellell Civil War could offer, due to it• uniqueneaa, a helpful guide to a 
better UDderataadtaa oi the probl ... aD4I perapectl•ea .. • of developiaa 
.. tioae in the field of iDtenaational relatioaa. To uaderetand 1• to be 
•711P•thatic. Tlaia vol'k la betas uadertakeD vitb a a,.,atbati� approach, 
hoping that auch aa UMl ... or vlll aot avail ltaelf to blaa. 
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C H A P T E R I 
I N T R O DUC T IO N  
The md of World War II vitueaaed the &•e.ala of a n• t.alanc. of 
,pawelt', ••••tially differ•t from th• luropean claaalcal balaDce of power. 
Crudely apeakiaa, bal.aac• of power aeao• a d•alre b1 aoverelpa atate• at 
pl'ev•tiq 4-.lution of the 1DternatioDa1 ayet• by ay OD• atata.l The 
claaalcal �laace of pow.er •1•t .. vaa divided betveea five aatioaa, 
al.moat equal to .. ch other ta allitazy aDCl ecODOllic atr ... tba fl'\&aala, 
1n alllaacea, coalf.t1ou, alMI even vera. lt belpM 1D pr .. esatiaa any OD• 
natiOD fwca bacoaba,a 4••nant. 
Tb• poet 1945 ulae• of paver •1•t• 1• ••••tlally betvMD two 
auperpoweraz the Ualted ltatu .., the Soviet 1Jaioa. All other balauce 
of powe·r ayat .. today are priMrily "inferior'' &1MI reatoaal. Th•r• are, 
for ample, aa Arab, • caribbeu, a South E••t A91M, a hl'k aad a 
Balkan balaee of power• the Mjor b•J.allce of paver la batveea two co&U.• 
tiou, the lorth At.:lantic Tr .. e1 Or&anisatloa llBd the WarHV Pact. It 1• 
a ltlpolar cli.•i•loa of 'PO'f•r 1D wlch l>otb coal1tlolw are domiuted by 
tl\elr ova reapectl•• auperpowr. Such a ltipolar 411Yi•ioa of power "lacr ... •• 
iatenaat'-81 t .. lOD _.the ,.••hility of var. W1tbout tile ahlftlq and 
11 ... n •it.el&, ''OU lalwe of fowe.- IJ•t•,0 JO!Dfl .21 
laterut&oel M&•lt•• "(1960), pp. 9·10. 
i 
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counterehifting of position•, there is leea need for intra•and inter• 
alliance eompromiee."2 It also make• it easier for the auperpower• to 
control their allies, 1ince the allie• are dependaat on thea. Therefore, 
it reducee the chance for the alliea to coerce their aenior partners into 
coaproaia1ng their position• vben they deem it neceaaary for the aainte• 
nance of peace. 
Thie examination will atudy the balance of power in the middle 
Katt between the traditioualiat and the progreaaive Arab govermae11t• in 
their confrontation in Yeaea. The paper will ex•ir&e the Yemeni dileiaa 
froa 1962 to 1969 and analyse the ttruggle for power between the oppoaiug 
forces. However, before the exaaiaation begin•, it 1• proper to reflect 
upc;m the preaeat day world in order that a better underatanding of the 
confliet in Yemen may be accompliahed. 
Power politic• ia the relation• between atate. It, thua, means 
iute1'D&tional.3 Indepen.dent state• come into conflict with other•, and by 
so dolq they inad'verteotly piay the "power gaae."4 The participant• want 
to •tad cloaely with their fr1•Dd•, but above all they want to •intain a 
favorable power poaition GYer their likely rival. It 1• every nation's 
aspiration to work for lt• eel! lntereat, and if it• intereat is 
endangered by another state, then a conflict, either ailitary, econoaic, or 
2Joba lpalur, World Politic• .!! !! Al! .2! gevolution, 
(Kew Yorks Frederick A. Pr••a•r, 1967), p. Sl. 
3Ala J-•· "Power Politic," Political Studies, (�tober, 
1964) • p. 307. 
4l!.t!!!. • , • 308 • 
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political or all three, enavee. "Every natioQ, to the atent tllat ita 
aovereignty aeau• anythiAg at all, aaeka to aaiotain 1t1 freedoa of 
actioa for itae1f ila matter• affecting it• vital intereat. n$ The ee•ene• 
of tatea:aatioaal politie• ia the struggle for pow•r . lt 1• of ne4eaaity 
power polttica.6 
The world flully i-uliaed after World Var 11 tb.at war ia aa 
trrattoaality. Thia rulintien waa 801'• eevei-•11 telt after 1945 becauee 
t1oo aad aophiaticatioa of ailitary equiflNut. Re vitaeaaecl the 
explo•tou ef the At.oaic ltlllb •1th hocnr arad 11••• an th• birth of tbe 
Cold War, aad caaa face to face· with.-at.ealle• capable of ltreakina the 
eound barrier. �•e •veat• beightaae4 hia aatoniabaea.t aza4 increased 
hie ,. •• ild.-. The Cold Val' u •i&aUicaat tn that it pitted the two 
au�• qatut eacll other. 
The po•••••ioD of atael.Mr W&J"b.U. Mk•• it illper-ative for the 
tecbaolo11 critical.lT .�,.. the lledalitie• oi tbe pr••eat a7atem aacl 
dir••tlv· affect• tbe ch•ac•• •f .. t.a&etata1 1Dternatloaal atabil1ty • • •  
temporary ailitary advaatage to acbine JIOU peraanent and favorable 
5theodore Weber, "Morality and lfational Pavet 1n International 
PoU.tic:•, " &eyiew: ti· f•lkic•, (Jawary, 1964), p. 34. 
'a.a. •qeath8't. lt11ti!! M!M !!ti.oil•, (law 'forki Alfred 
A. IDopf, ltSS), p. 31. 
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diatrlbution of power without riaking unpr..:edented and prohibitive aelf· 
4eatructioa.u7 Strategie• in a nuclear war would be almoat .. utngleaa. 
Therefore, tbe atability of dete1Tence between the Uaited State• aad the 
Soviet Union ia the atab11ity of the world. The reaaoD interaatioaal 
stability i• ao much influenced by nuclear weapon• ia due to the aveaome 
deatructiYe P'ft'•r of nuclear am.a and the 0uabeU.evably compr•••ed tilDa 
in vhich auch deatructioa would take place. Moreover, no country wherever 
located and however atroaa ailitarily can, under current lllld foreaeeable 
circuaatancea, realiatically believe itaelf imaune froa the power and 
reach of nuclear weapou."8 It bae b&ea roughly eatimated that a third 
world var would annihil.ate JOO million Chineae, lSO ailU.oo Americana, 
and betweeo 100 and 150 ailU.on auaaiana. Such deetructiv••••• or the 
threat of it ha• illpoae4 a a• balance.9 loDe of the nperpovera haa a 
tnmp card over the other, &1Ml both are vulnerable to def.enalve aecond-
ary atrill••· Becauae both poa•••• the capabllitiea to atrike back, they 
bne a maclear parity or ataU...te. The reaU.aatioa of thi• pheacmeaoo 
haa forced th- to adopt the policy of ,.acefv.l coaiatence, or peacef\11 
competition over the aeutral world aDCl ecODOllic rivalry. The Cold War in 
e••ace ba1 beca11e aa ideoloatcal and ecoaoaic coaflict. Many analyats 
71. Zoppo, "ltuclear Technology, Mlltipolarity, and International 
Stability," World Politic•. (July, 1966), p. S90. 
8lbtd • •  ,. sao. 
90lema Snycler, "lalance of Power in the Miaaile Age," 
Journal & Interpatioul Affairs, (1960), p. 21. 
s 
militarily, will tend to eacourage the creatiou of a kind of high-level 
etrategic umbrella, reducina the likelihood of large•acale aeneral war• 
fare and, therefore, makina.the iaternatioaal areaa ••fer for varioua 
kiu41 of l••••r varfare.10 Thia aeane tvo thin1•1 (1), the �i& powers 
caa UD4ertake military adveature• on a ... 11 acale, aot directly coatag 
into contact with the vital iatereat of the other bis pc:nrer1 and, (2), it 
'8pl1ea that third•rate nation• can expert.ent with ailitary lnterTention 
of their CND wtth tbt bl•••ina and/or condemnation of one of the big 
povera. 
While a atate of peaceful coexiatence i• the pr�vailina code 
between the CO"W'miat and capitaliat c-.pa, it a-.erth•l••• i• influenced 
by the tr ... nd<>ua tapaot of the appearance of a "third world."ll the 
third world coaprieea tboee nation• pr .. ioualy under coloaial control who 
bne ••t•r•d the iaternation.al acen•.- .. They h•v• l>roupt vi th tbea the 
idea that the "new icleoloaical atruaale haa tranafonaecl contemporary 
f.Dteratate relation• lato • total pol1tic•l•llDral coafli�t."12 MoreoYer, 
they waat to uvance ·t1'eil" aatiOll9 eeea•£cally, while at the .... time 
•teerina clear of ia.ol• .... t• with the two 8\lperpovans. 
Th• 4eYelopiDI c.watrt•• � to.�e fr .. to decide fo� t1' ... •l••• 
what aery.- tha i•tere•t of their people, but caaaot 4o 10 if 
they beeome i4eatf.fi .. wt.th polki..a. 11buh, la tbeit. •in. ddeat 
the real.iaation of tbia purpoae. That ie why they exploit.. the 
10.elmut Schai4t, l•f•!!! ll !,etaU.atio!, (In TKk: Praeger. 
1962), pp. 207-208. 
llMario loaai, Ih.! Tbid World, (Jllew Tork: funk aad Wapala, 
Co • •  lnc • •  1963), p. 4. 
l2Joha Spanier. World folitica _!!! .!! §! � R•Yolution, p. 196. 
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rlvalriea between the power• while refuaina to take eica.ai 
they exploit the cold war while refuaing to become participants 
111 1t. 13 
The third vorl4 waut• •coua.ic 6aaiatacee fraa the 4eveloped aatioa s ,but 
they aleo ••••rt that they want it with no •trina• attached. Their 
apyreheaeiona over colouial181D aakea thea aa eatier taraet for comauniat 
acroacbmeut. However, thia is not entirely the caae. Ghana and Indoneaia 
have depoaed pro-co•muaiat reata.a. Th•y �ecome iadi&D&Q.t over big power 
ailitary iaterweatioa in the iaternal affair• of a ... 11er nation. lut 
their voices are aometiae• very low, •• waa the caae during luaaia'a 1968 
ailitary intervention ia the internal af faire of CaechoalOT&kia. •••dle•• 
to aay, the third world r.aiaa •• a 110ral fo.-ce &Def partial deterrent to 
bia paver clu4natine io.curaiou. 
While it may appear that the areat power• moat frequently promote 
au-veraion and elandeaatilae operation• abroad or direct outriaht 
interventi0111, thi• iapreaaiou 1• not e011pletely accurate. TIU•, they 
are draaati•ed vben they occur. However, aaaller aationa have al•o used 
theae technique• to achie.e or proaote political valuea. Some aaall 
utioaa, due to their cliel1ke for coloui& iea, h•• •upported liberation 
llO'f...ate in.order to 4rive the fore•• �f reaction aD4 iaperiali•• out 
oif their re.ion. �lg.x:J.a...�ea a• aa illuatratloll. In it• f iaht for 
independence, it ha4 the aaai..at&n.ce and euptort of it• neighbor•, Tuniaia 
and Morocco. It aleo received ailitary �1'911 froa lgypt and other Arab 
nationa. Morocco baa been eetive in or1aniain1 auerrilla activitie• in 
MauritADi& and ••iallborina Spaniab Sahara, an4 up until Prader len l•lla's 
1Jx.rio R.oaai, .22.:. c!t. , p. 77. 
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d.U.ee, the Algeriau aoverament ••rved •• the ceuter iD Africa for 
ftuaactaa. oraaniaing. an4 tniDing foreian utional• in the 
technique• of clandeetine political action, aulrveraion, and guerrilla 
warfare. Cuba, in the Americ.an h.ai•phere, vae uportilag rnolutioue 
an4 claude•tine political aad ail1tary action• to Central and South 
America. 
Noderniaation in the uoderdeveloped area of the world ha• 
become a reality. In the Kiddle Baet it ha• revolutionised the thinking 
and behavior of the people and ha• set up two cooflicting ideologiee. 
The traditional vay of llfe 1• rapidly, bowever,reluctantly, giving way 
to llOderniaation. The barl'ler1 that culturally eel educationally had 
previou•ly 1eparated the lliddle iast from the reet of the world hava beeu 
proar•••ively breakiaa down. The revolutionaries, headed by Egypt, have 
swung the balance of power between the traditionaliat and progre .. ive 
•leacnt1 Lil the area in favor of the ao4et'Diser. Due to tbie development, 
the di•i•iou of 1tate a:a4 aociety baa beea &¢ca11pllehed in some area•. 
Thi• dtvi•ion i• COllf&raDl• to the divi•ion of Church aa4 State in the 
W•at. Th• function of the atate which wae narrow an4 lnvolvecl prlmarily 
defen•e ea4 legal la•titvtioa•• ,.rforaed avch other ftauctioo as th• 
individual dea&Dded. The revelvtiou ia Ymea in fact •d• tbe diviaiou 
poeaible. Since K31pt va• the progt•••i•• leader ta the Arab world. it 
•ought to aid the Yemeni levolutiooariee attain euch a division. 
Since the IU4dle laetera countriea want to puraue their objective•, 
they u•u•lly turn to one or 'oth of the big povera for ••sietance. It 
baa becoae cuatomary for the revolutionarie• to befriend the Soviet Union 
and tile traditionali•ts the United States. Such a development began to 
8 
take •ha,. •• early u 195S. leedle•• to aay, Egypt, which ta believed 
to be the apokellllall for the Arab r_,,olutionarie•• conaidera the United 
State• too often iD league with the force• of iaperiali•• and neo• 
coloolali... To the Egyptian thi• aeana that the United Statea will not 
aeek to create a Middle Eaat empire, but, rather, it ia too cloaely 
aaaociated with the lritiab and reactionary Arab regiaea. Jy reactionary, 
the Egyptian mean1 the monarchiea of the area and the goveroment• which he 
claiae do not repreaeut popular conaent or the interest of the people. Re 
araue• that these regillea are baaed upon an economic and political elite 
vho keep power against the beet interest• of the coaaon ••••e• by co• 
operating with the foreign power• having a atake in the country.15 He 
cltea, for .example. the Western economic interest• iQ the oil producing 
cOUDtriea la the MicWle laat. Foreign economic intereata only hinder• the 
political daci•iooa of the respective govermaenta. hence, making thoae 
govermaeota dependent upon foreign capital. Thie, the Egyptian reiterate•, 
i• conduci•• to the political elite becau•e it abets thea in maintaining 
their econoaic• •octal� aad political interest•, and therefore in making 
p-roare•• and 1104'en1-U.oa atatic. tevolutioni• ha• becoee an" ideology 
that incoTporate• an cwer•all world view •ad provide• a baaia for change.1116 
lt b nat'toaali•tic, aatihierarehic, &ad aociaU.•tlc. The Y ... nt Ci•il 
War ha• focuaed on the dif ferencea between progreaaivee and conaervatt•e• 
in the Ara� worl•. 
Egypt aDd Saudi Arabia have frequelltly utilised propaganda agaioat 
foreigD audience• in their ef forta to unde�ine aupport for Middle laatern 
l.S,rohn s. Baden, "USA and UAR," Foreign Affair•• (January, 1965), p. 286. 
16Adbul Said• i;!c•pi • of !!taruational Politics, (Kev York: Prentice-Ball• Inc., t � • •  Tf�. 
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�eglae•. They have fiuaoced and oraaniaed aeaaaelnatioc plot•• aad 
have bribed official• in neighborlua countriea. ror approximately •llt 
year•• they have beet:a engaged ailitarily iD the aff•ir• of Y ... n. of 
which more will be said. The•e .. ..,lea illuatrate the tenaiona iu 
the third world aad invoke th• lil>eral and flexible polic1ea of the 
auperpowen in permitting eucb overture• by aaall natiou. Thi• i• not 
to iaply that the ••perpovera are indifferent to th••• ..all•power behavior. 
but rather 'o eay that it ia the "balauc• of t.error0 or deterrence which 
force• t.hea to perait au¢h actiona.17 A• ve have ••en• •oth the United 
State• and the Sovi•t Union have a veeted iutereat in avoiding war. The 
big povere do. hGWever. reetrain eaaller natioa• fl'Oll reaort�a to vio• 
lence vbeneve� poeaibl�. or '4\eueve� their influence 1• etroog enough to 
prnail. OD iine other hand. bla ad. ... 11 povera have bquu to utilise 
vara of proxy. Significantly, tne Algerian revolt vaa aimad at expalling 
the Prench hegemony from Algeria. Sa.all nation• who undertake to fight 
ware by proxy uaually h.ve the approval from one of the euperpowera. 
Bgypt haa the •t•ped approval of the Ussa to enter th• Yeaen conflict 
on the aide of the Rep\lblican Ytimeniae. Bence, while th• lapubllcan• are 
Egypt'• proxy, �gypt serve• aa the Soviet Union'• proxy. 
Proxy ware break out when the balance of power in a region ia in 
danger of breaking down. The Paki1tani•lndian War of 1965 vaa the reault 
of the belief held by Pakiatan that the regional balance of power in that 
area had been 1erioualy upaet due to the military aid India received from 
both the Soviet Union and the United States after the Sino�soviet conflict 
17 �·•I>• 217. 
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of 1962. When the Imaa of Yemen vaa ousted, Saudi Arabia fearecl that 
the balance of power in th• area might shift in favor of the revolution­
ariea. Thi• fear bee ... a reality :wt.en Egypt came to the aid of the 
lapublic. awl Saudi Araaia vaa therefore compelled to enter the conflict 
by aidf.Da and aupportiag the Itoyaliat reeiatence. The big powerg did not 
eater the Yeaen1 conflict becauaa they feared it might eacalate to the 
nuclear level and alao becauae they probably believed that tbe coet would 
have outweighed the benefit. Hence. they etayed ill the background. 
allowing Saucli Arabia and E&YPt, their reapective proxiea. to carry the 
burden of the war. 
In the riext aeveral chapter•, thia examination will atudy the 
Yemeui Civil War in liaht of the balance of power between the tradition­
aliata and the proareaaivieta ill the area. 
C B A P T E R 11 
OR IG IN S OF TH E CONT ROVERSY 
Origins of the Controverey 
The September 26, 1962, Yemeni military coup ended the more 
than one•th�eaDd year old Imaaate rule of Yeaen. The lllam la both 
head of •tate and religtoua l .. der of hi• people. for two hun4red years, 
the lllaaa ha' atruggled againat the Turk1· and 1t waa only ahortly before 
World War I, mad .. a reault of the ••cee•al\11 ettorta of· the buaa Yabya 
lbn Baa14•al•Din to liberate hi• country, that the OttOll&a 111ptwe finally 
hlaa tabya,. vho•• reip la •••enc• bega tn 1918, '-vot•• 
biaaelt to four priacipl••t the reatoration of iateraal order which had 
collapae4 altoaether 4uriaa the era of Turklah ctoaiaatlon; the building 
u p of the tJea1ury1 keeptq fol'•ipera out& aacl kytaa aurplua World 
War l veapoo•• which were either sold to the lthiopiaa ia the lt30•• or 
•l•• were etorod in cavea.l We eucceaafullJ acht•••d all four pollclea. 
The 1eo1raphic locatie>n of t...sa .. de hi• ,.1ic1 of taolatioDlam poeeible. 
for .. ..,,., the coaatal water• of the ae4 I•• are ehallov and full of 
treacherou• r .. fa, ao4 ther• vaa ao algnlfic .. t or apt�y te-..cl 
conatructlve port in T-.a. To Jua t&hya, "all aoa•Arab• v.re lritiah 
ageDta ia diagutae. le fearM that !Dgl&IMI tat ..... to ._.. r- jv.at 
•• eh• bu amaexM AcleD ia 183t."2 Durt.aa hia r.&.p there••• ao .. Jor 
att-.pt to llOdemiae Y..... In 1948• he vaa uaualnat .. ltJ Ab4ullah 
al•Waair'• follower•, vho wanted to rid th ... elvea of tbe a.d.d ••l•Din 
Dyaa t7 aad replace it with the al•Waalra. !be coup vaa • failure. 
1stauto Ouleecu, "the War and the 11aradh Conference," Review of 
Politica� v. JXVIII, (July, 1966), p. 319. n!!!·· p. 319. 
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Crown Prince Ahmed defeated the revolutioaari•• 81ld had th .. behea4ed, 
including their leader al•Wa•ir. 
Ahmecl �.e ... kieg 1D 1948. lie 1oat1tute4 e•rtaia ainor pro• 
an••i•• reforma, by ukiq tleala with th• A8artc ... , lll••iaoa, m4 
Cc mi•t Chine•• to help hi• IMHlernise Y--1. To tile ._rtcaa•, be 
IT•oted the f trat oil UMl aiaeral cooeeaeioa YtmaD ha• .a4le to a 
foreiga eoo�el'D. H• •iaa•' a trade treaty with Ch• a .. tet Uaiea, vhoae 
acwenmeat froaiaed to build factod.ee ia Y ... n and to ai.e it technical 
•••i•t•noe. Ii• ••• 111Jhume4 •l·lur, after tou�loa lu�, Aata, aad 
Africa, fiaall1 concl\Mled aa •1re ... ot vtt� t�• Cl 111iat c:llill••• which 
arante4 T ... • a loan of •16,SI0,000 for a teu•1••r per1o4. Thay were to 
1-uild a read froa 8o41d.ab to Sana. Iu 1961, aa -..r1c:an film vaa graoted 
ao oppoTtunlty to build a road froa Tats, the •out"•ru capital of teaeu., 
to Sana. If acc-..pli1he4 tbl• would liell the three .. jor citi•• by paved 
roa4. Th• lu•i•u• tn the .... u ... h.H bepm ltuildiag th• fort o! 
aodeidah, equipped with 811Hlera up•tOll'4at• facillti••· 
lmaa Ahae4, like bi• father �•fore bill, dieliked tb• la1li•h 
becau•• cd their eoatiau!na OCCUf•tiOll of ••• an4 the ProteetOTate. Be 
att ... ted t• 4iapel the lrtttall from hi• •Mlthena -.Ord•� ... �eun1te the 
Greater y.._ ...Ser lat• centr.1. Ill .. rcb I, 19'81 he jolae4 the Vnited 
Arab .. public, theD comprtaiq of Bant ... l�ta. 1a a f .. Hatf.on called 
the Unite4 Aru Stat.... lsh a uaitJ vu loo••· !ha X- v.a attll the 
power lu t...a. thereafter he ••ot lur to lbacov to n•aotiate for an 
anu d .. 1. 81• ualty with the Unite• Arab aepublic 1ileuced ladio Cairo. 
and at the .... time, aade laaaer u ally ia hi• atruaal• with the lritiah 
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in Aden. ''Many of the Iaaa'• movea were with an eye to aboviug the 
lritiah out of the chain of ahei�doma along the southern rim of Arabia 
which bad accepted Britiah protection."3 When fighting broke out between 
Yeen and the British contt.Daent in Aden, Priece Badr declared "that 
Yemen would accept aid from &n)'Vhere or anyone againat the Engl1sh."4 
The United Arab Republic in the eeantime had sent to Yemen teacher•, 
technician•, and advisor• to help Yemen in it• internal and external 
difficulti••· 
Dr«lll Pearaon once called Imam Ahmed an "Old IWl&&rd." Whether 
auch a label vae juat'ifiable, it waa, never�helee•, a de•cription of the 
man. Ahmed vaa a cruel and vicioua leader. Be beheaded bi• half-brother, 
Seif al•lelaa Abdullah in 19SS, when the latter attempted to ouat him. 
Along with Abdullah thirteen other• were executed in the aame manner. In 
1959, he returned to Yemen froa Italy, where he had been undergeing 
medical treatment for hi• ailments. and clamped down 011 all who had b.een 
responsible for the diaturbance of the peace. Be cancelled the refol'1119 
and threw agitator• into priaoa. Prince la.ctr went into eemi•retir•ent. 
"Difference• between the two over Yemen'• future had ca•t • cloud over 
Prince al•ladr's chance• of eucce•aion to the throne."' Ria chief sup• 
porter• were reform-minded youth• of the kingdom and the United Arab Ile• 
public. While al•ladr had ahowo himaelf to be a progresat•e• his in•-
btlity to control the dieturbancea caused by hi• attempted refcnma. 
3n1maa •!med l>l•• at 7li &uler of Yemen 9at1on," The 
Evening §tar, (September 20, 1962). p. A-4. 
---
'+stanlto CJuleacu, .21• cJt., p. 321. 
5ne EftDiDI Star, �· Cit., P• A•4. 
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belittle4 hia ability to -..&e and implement refol'IB8. In all, however, 
i... Allaed'• reiga vae very -..ch like hi• father'•i •trict i•olationiam. 
"lo one coul4 enter or luve the kingcloa without hla approval. Re 
excluded foreip techeolo11. foreip lnv••taents, ad uove all fereip 
ideae."6 Alme4 did •••1p foreip fl� to enter hi• country, l:>ut thi• 
aome•odd•yeare, Y-.n ha41 fw car•• few factoriea., f.ew ltooka, an4 thl'•• 
or four aewa,..pera.1 
Oil lept.-.er 19, 1962, X... Ahlaed died of natural illne.s•••· Bia 
eon, aactr, vu cho•n at the Great Moeque in Sana •• tbe aew lean. Be 
heade4 a proar•a•ive faction, and on •ucceediua hi• father, ha illmediately 
aanoune" illportaat reforM, including the creation of .an elected 
•••ellbly. Bi• proareaaive reform. never bad time for fulfillment, becauae 
eD Septellber 26, 1962, a veek after hi• ncceaeion, a •iU.tary coup oueted 
tbe toyal a�•rmwnt aad the Zaidi Dynaaty by bombardina hi• palace in Sana. 
The Z•141 rule (the Zaldl 1ect of l•lam ta aleo a aect of the tel'Dl Shil, 
.. anlng party, referriaa apeeifically to the party of All, aoo·in-law 
of th• prophet, Mohwtl) vaa diaantle4. YWD uacler th• t.M-te rule 
preeeotea a 411 ... l outlook ••Sai•tratively. "llot a atn.gle llinlatry 
capule of perforaina a pPlic functloa vaa to be fO\JDd at the time of 
the rewlution."8 
'ow Ad•• Scbllidt, Jwa: lJ!! Rpkno!p W•t, (Mew Tork: 
Reiahart and Wlneton. 1968), p. 37. 
7Tbe lven.iug Star, .22· ill· p. A•4. 
8w1111• lrOWD, '"f--i 1>11-.," 1Ud4lt l!!1 J9!!£P!l, •· XVII, (AutO'llll, 1963), p. 357. 
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The Yemen Revolution vae lead by Abdullah al-Sallal, who had 
been the head of the palace guard and a former prieon•cell occupier 
under X... Ahmad from 1948-1955. He waa eent to prison by Ahmed for 
alleged conepiracy with the 1948 revolutioniete. lefore thie incident, 
he had been eent to Iraq for further advao.ce4 military training. Be 
returned to Yemen vith new experience• and ideae that opened hie mind. 
Re then began to formulate � political tdeolol}' baaed on Ara� Nationalism 
and aoupt to correct the oppreeeione of the rule of the tmaaa. Abdullah 
al•Sallal va1 repeatedly aent to priaon for hie effort• by Imam Yahya. 
In priaou hi• political thinking and ideas were atimulated by contact with 
leading liberal• in the Y9men political jail at Bajjah. Be became 
acquainted with Koh8111Hd Ahmed loman. Abdulrabmau al•lryani, and 
Ahmed al-Shai. The fol'ller tvo were to become fU·ll member• aid 
participant• of the revqlution. The latter became ainieter of the Yemen 
Legation in lmadon. r ... iuing in that poaition after the rnolution. 
Shami alao became the Boyali•t foreign miniater. and headed the loyallet 
delegation to the Bara4b Conference of 1965. All three had participated 
in the 1948 revolution &Del bad been aaaociated with the free Teaetli 
..,....nt tn Adee. Sallal won hi• rel•••• fwoa prtaoa la 1955 upon the 
inatateaee of aac1r. vho bad taken a llktn1 to hill. Sallal vaa then 
aaatpaed �y ... r to ba hadMtr .. ater at lloclet•ah. Ia 1961 laall Ab=ed; 
•en•ina tbe danger of.Sallal, rel••�ed bia from hi• Job. Badr then 
appointed hi.mi chief of hi• peraonal guard without the taaa'• 
objection. 
Other pTOaillADt Yemeni revolution.ad.•• vere Moh•• 11 d al•Zubairi. 
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DT. AWuru..n al•leldu.i, ud ICDh•iD al•Ainl. lubairi ••caped the 
p\Uliahmeat of 1-..a Ahmad in 1948 becauae of hi• participation in the 1948 
d-1••· •• f lecl to Cairo ancl eatabli•he4 the f irat initial headquarter• 
for eail•• t.-..ai pol1t1clana. •• remained iD C�iro agitatiD& for a 
reformed U.-te. Under th• revolutiooary reaiM, ha aerYecl u a ainlater 
ad attempte4, to no avall . .. to find a haata for reconciliation between 
republicaa• aad royaU.ata. 09 Dr. laidani vaa fortunate to bne i.een ee11t 
to Egypt for atudi••. Upon th• uqent appeal of aadr • lJUa Alm9d later 
••t bbl to loan• We•t GeruBJ to aene u 111D.1ater to th• Yemen 
doctor of politic•l ee--.. .. retuned to Yemen in 1961 hoping to 
become th� �1Dgdaa' • .COD09lc pluaaer.10 When thi• faile4 to aaterlaliae, 
he -.oved to Cairo a1*d lteaaa capalplq qatui the :i-. lie vaa penraltted 
to engage Y04lf•tou•l1 la .. ,, •• propag...aa .. tl•lti•• aaato•t the i..aa 
becauae the 'Ola1te4 Ara 8tatu ba4 !Ma• teraiaatri tty Ru•er. Th• termi-
nation of the 'f�rau ..... va• l•raely cl•• to i- Almecl • • poea eond ... lag 
8a•1er•e toclalt .. .. -..ati�.la� 
I 
TU lora "1•� • � utloaaliae other ...,1.•e pl'O,.rty. 
Let ua retura h hl•ic lawe'&Dd let u• have uaion on our tera. 11 
Maaaer thereupon tertaUaate4 the •ect•r•tieu of Arab ltatee that for three 
year• bad •••ociated politically the feud.al Yemeni t=reeete with the 
revolutioaary Uolte4 Arab lapul>lic. Thi• event had 10 angered Raaaer that 
9 Adam Schai•t' 1..,:1!\! V!pkDOVl,l !!!!:· ,. 70. 
Ull.9id. , p. "71. 
lL'Koran •· Soctalt•," Ji•, (.J._.ry 5, 1962), p. 22. 
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apeculatioa• att..,u.q to link l••••r •• the engilaeer �eblnd the rnolu-
tion camaot �· ipored� "lt bad been videl7 repol'ted, although not 
mentiODecl ta Cairo, that Mr. h11er engineered tile Saoa coup to aive pan-
Arabi818 and Arab natiooal1aa a new Aeian foothold after th• lo•• of 
Syria • • •  Cairo radio ha• 'been heard loud ud el••r ad the free Yemen 
8>'Vement in C•iro had be8U. aided all4 abetted. 1112 
llobain al•Aioi, in eoatr••t to the other leader• mentioned above, 
\iaa the ouly pramto•t revolutionary froa the Z•id1 aec:t. Be studied in 
Egypt and later 111 Sorboae. In 1958 he bu ... a teacher in Aden, but 
va1 �•11ed ill 1960 •��•ua• of bia aaaociatioua with radical Ade11e1e 
element• and becauae of his teach'na•· 
A.U, of the ah.c:Ne ... cloned aaaea wewe re1pectecl by lach'. Re 
eapecially 1£ke4 lallal.., ..tao .. a 11ke-aln4a4 liberal, would h•l• hi• 
realise hi• ova lillaral ... lratloaa. ''The coef1dence be placed in hi• 
•utPO••d frlead 1a fact &4altte4 tbe llaaaerltea to the moat een1itive 
imaer •tr#Ct•I'• of 1alaic f0¥9r aD4 prepared it• c:leatructioa.1113 ladr 
bad a keu tru•t •l•o fol' ... . r. Speaktq to reportes• 011 ao.ember 11, 
1962, he lamented aDd umttedi u1 ha4 alyqa coeaUei-ed b.ia.•• . friend 
aod a brQtber ad bellnM 1a hi• pl"OldHe."14 •••rtb•l•••• tbe t ... 111 
a.volutiOD beaen al>ruptly, all4 by al•ladr'• auP?O••d friead•, when not 
aany outetdera we.-e ea,.otlaa it. 1'ot 91Gr• tha1l tveoty•tour hour• after 
12Jay Wala, "JUdeaat Taal.on &iaee," J!! Iork timee, 
(October 14, 1962), p. 4·1. 
lJoana Sebm1Alt. J_.p: · !!! V¥M!J! !!.£, p. 73. 
14eptro 111••• ''Dead Kiq bu Plua to latuna. to Palace Soon, 11 
Wa•hi!I� �. (Movember 11, 1962), p. A-20. 
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it ha4 been carried out, Egyptian force• began arriving into Teman via 
the newly finlahed Port of Rodetdah. w .. aer'• t ... diate dispatch of an 
expeditionary force into t ... n to help the aepubltean• may �e attributed 
to three factor• he avmredly belie9ed in: Pir•t, the Wattonal Charter, 
inaugurated oa May 19'2 by him and eatabllahing an icleologtcal baeia 
for •0cialiea in Egypt, 4eclard on"the l1eceaaity of the Revolution:" 
I.evolution b the only •aua, by which the Arab ••tioe can 
free it•elf of it• •hackle•, and rid itaelf of the dark 
heritage which bur4ened it. for, the element• of aupprea• 
•ion 81ld aplottatton vbich long doalnated the Ar-! Watton 
and eeiaed it• se�lth will never willingly aubs1t. ' 
Second, the "element• of traclitioualt .. and reaction aga1net foreign 
iuflueaicea are preaent �ut Arabi .. 1• more charaeteriatically the feeling 
that the only way for the Arab• to be anything 11 for them to be them­
••l••• • "16 Thin, he beli .. ed that t-.a va1 ctue for a revolution, and 
he va• ready to n�t f.�. ''We were aaked tot: help, aad we will r ... in 
there until it 1• certain the rnolutlon ia eecun."17 
The Teaeni loyali•t• now begmi to 1ather arOUIMI the remaining 
loyal family in the northern mountatnoua reaion of Yemen. With the 
appearance of ladr on the 1ceue. it &ecaae ea1ier for the Royalists to 
unify. They now had a coamon leader, and the Counterrevolutionary 90Ve• 
.. nt thus began. 
The preeence of �SYPtian aoldier• ill Yemen prompted Saudi Arabia 
to come to the aid of the royaliete. 1t waa evidently clear in it• 
151Jnited Arab .. �lie, ll!.! Chart•I, (Cairo, IDfotaatiou 
Depart .. ut, n.d.), p. 11. 
16Charl•• D. Cr ... u•, I!! Araba g .£!!! Wotld, (Wew York: 
l'rederick A. Praeaer, 1963), p. ,7. 
p. 128. 
17 Jay Wal1, The IU4clle B••t, (Bw Yorltt Atheneua, 1965) • 
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infancy that the conflict had become larger in acope. 
Behind the Imam etood king Saud and King Hueeein of Jordan 
as Champions of legitimate government and wholehearted anti• 
communiem • • • •  On the other aide were President Baaaer of 
Egypt and hia followers, representing the gloriee of Arab 
nationali811l and aocial progreee • • • •  The claah between these 
two group• haa overahadoved the local struggle in Yemen, 
and ha1 threatened to transform the whole power pattern in 
the Middle Eaat. 18 
By January 1963, the situation had become one in which aocialiam and 
traditionalism in the Arab World were pitted against each other--Yemen 
serving a1 the arena. It also became the stage for the atruggle for 
power between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab llepublic. The balance 
of power was undergoing a strain, ae each internal faction waa now 
eupported by an outeide power. 
18navid Holden, "At Croea-Purpoaea in the S&nda of Yemen," 
The Reporter, (February 14, . 1963), p. 37. For a eimilar view eee alao: 
Philip Morton, "Our Yemeni Policy: Purauit of a Mirage," The Reporter, 
(October 24, 1963), p. 28. 
C H A P T E R Ill 
I NI TI AL A T TEMPTS AT RE SO LVI NG THE CO NFLICT 
Initial Attempt• at Reeolving the Conflict 
"Preaident Maeir aeized on the revolution in Yemen in September 
1962 ae an opportunity to break out of hie isolation in the wake of 
Syria'• aeceeeion from the UAll, and regain the initiative in Arab affairs 
for Egypt on the baaia of revolutionary leadership.111 Therefore, one day 
after the Yemen Revolution vae proclaimed, an Egyptian expeditionary force 
began arriving in Yemen. Thia contingent had the explicit aeeigmnent of 
helping and aaauring the revolution of eucceee. Mo sooner had the revolu-
tion been proclaimed and the Egyptian troops etarter moving into Yemen, 
than the reai1tance from the northern hiibland Zeidi tribe• began to form. 
Although aucb reeiatance vae minimal at the outeet, it was 1000 to become 
a major armed resistance. Thie vaa possible because of several events 
that tranapired after initial shock of the revolution. First, Imam al-Badr, 
who had been reported buried under the rubble• of his palace when the rebel 
tank• shelled hie domain, appeared two weeks later at a Royalist camp. Bia 
appearance gave the Royaliata a coamon, accepted leader. Around him con-
gregated the Royal family and Royalist supporters, whoae main objective• 
were the re1toration of the lmamate and legitimacy. Second, Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan began to aid the Royalist• by supplying them with &l'llll and 
money. Their main concern was the presence of United Arab Republic troops 
and the creation of a hoatile regime in Yemen. Since 1959, the Egyptian• 
had worke4 againat both of thtm. Saudi Arabia, in particular, becauae of its 
lM&lcolm I.err, l!:!! Arab Cqld !!.!!.: 1958-1967, aecond edition, 
(London: Oxford Univereity Pre••• 1967), p:-141:---
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traditional •y•t ... of Wahuina dating from the eighteenth century, 
wat fearful of it• own eecurity and felt obliged to enter the conflict. 
�ing Saud wae reported to be therefore arming the Royali•t• because of 
hie fear that if a republic were eetabliahecl on hi• eouthern border he 
would be aext on the liat.2 
It wae evidently clear at the beginning of the conflict that the 
Jtoyaliet• were strong. They coutrolled and maintained control over the 
northern and eastern part of Yemen. Such an area waa not to be relt.n• 
quiehed, with the exception of the city of Marib, about 75 milee west of 
Sana and Sada. The•e northern and ea•tern region• had aerved aa the 
Iaamate atronghold every atnce the geneaie of the Illaute rule in th• 
ninth century A.D., abovt 100 •ilea north of Sana. Sada underwent 
constant change of hande. According to Harold Ingraaa, the accusation• 
lDAde by the Egyptian• that Saudi and Jordani� troop• were fiahting with 
the Imaa'• forcea, or that they had been able to give any aignificant help 
in the Yemen are unfounded. The only help the aoyali•t• had receiYed 
from Saudi Arabia and Jordan vaa food and perhapa money. 3 While thia 
conteotion vae being verifi9d by all the reporter•, including Corlnel 
McLean, M.P., who reviewed the Y.amen conflict from the Royali•t• and 
Republican area•, !SYPtian troop• aradually increased in mmbere. By 
December, 1962 there were 13•000 UAR troop• in Yemen. Tb• Republican 
army wae ineffective aDd ... 11. It vaa eYidently clear to laaeer that the 
Yemeni regimt 111U•t atep up it• pace in d.veloping an army capable of 
2y. Ahkaryov, "Arabia and the Yemeni Revolution," !!! Time•, 
(December S, 1962), p. 7. 
lttarold Ingr&JU, The Ieaen: �, Ruler•, .!ru! Revolution, 
(London: Camelot PTeae, Ltd., 1963), p. 135. 
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••fending the Republic. P1el4•M.l.rehal Amltr of the United Arab Republic 
v .. therefore eeat to Yemen in October to urge Sallal to11&ke the effort. 
R• obliged. &\it before anything could develop, th• first of many 
aepublieau 4iaharmonies •rvpted. It involved a personality conf liet 
between Sallal and Abdulrahman aeighani. The intellectual, Egyptian-born 
leidhani could not accept the Zeidi, self-promoted lield•Marehall, Sallal 
a• his auperior.4 The disagreement was aolved by the unexpected arrival 
of Beidhani in Cairo and bis •ub•equent talk• with Raaaer. This meeting 
led to leidhani'• temporary retirement. 
The Yemeni problem cmae at a tiae when the United State• waa 
involved crucially in the Cu�a Crisis of 1962. Yemen vae very far away 
from it• mind. Nonetheless, the Cennedy administration, aa early 1961, 
had been attempting to review its Kiddle Eastern policy. It wanted to 
negate the opinion held by "progressive" state• in the world that the 
United State• aupports and abet• "reactionary" regimes. In the case of 
Yemen the United States could not openly give the Republican regime ita 
recognition becauae of the complexity of the situation. It waa Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan, it• friend•, aupporting the Imam, and it could not 
overlook thia factor without endangering it• vital interests in the area. 
President Kennedy began peraonally to eend meesagee to Nasser and Paiaal, 
urging the two to aubdue the aituation. Ou October 25, 1962 Preaident 
Kennedy aent a letter to Faisal aaeuring the Saudi Government of American 
aupport. Thia letter waa not forwarded to Faiaal until after the Saudi 
town• of Majran aud Hisaa had been bombarded by Egyptian plane• in 
retaliation for Saudi eupport of the twyaliata. According to the 
4Ibid., p. 136. 
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lgyptian•. Saudi Arabiaa iOVD• cloae to the Yeaeni•Saudi Arabian border 
were ••l'Ving •• a refu1• for the loyali•t•. Keanedy ' •  letter was aot 
.. de public until January i963 after further l&YPtian air•raida had 
taken place. In the lett•� dae Pre•ident saids "You may be •••ured of 
full u. s. aupport for tke ulatenuce of Saudi Arabian integrity. "5 
While President lenauy vaa keeping in touch with both ••••er 
and Paiaal. the State Departlaent begaD to contact all tho1e concerned 
with the Yemeni probl ... escept the Iaaa. 6 It• aain objective waa a 
1ettl...nt .  Kennedy at the ead of •ovellber propoaed atepe towar4 a 
aettleaant to Crown Prillce Jalaal. King Buaaeiu. and Preeident Raaaer. 
Once again, the Iaam, althou&b •till officially recognized by the United 
State• , vaa left out. 7  The propoaal called on the United Arab R.epu1>lic 
to withdraw it• troop• and aaked Saudi Arabia to withhold further material 
aid to the Royalist•. The United States, fearin1 Egyptian rejection of 
it• propoaal ,  prOllli•ed to recognise the tepublican regime. ly this 
method, it waa hoped laypt would give its acceptance to the agreement . 
On December 19, 1962 the United State• 1ave the Yemeni Arab Republic full 
recognition. It bad taken the United States three month• to reach that 
deciaiou. The United Nation• followed with ita recognition. Britain, 
however, did not approve of the action• by the United State• and the 
United Nationa and auggeated that the United State• bad acted in baste. 
The rationale behind the United State• recopition of the 
41.s. Depart9"1nt of State Bulletine, (January 28 , 1963) , p .  145. 
6nana Adame Schmidt ,  Yemeni the Unknown War, p. 186. - -
7 lbid • •  p. 186. 
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Jlepublican government were •• follow•: (1) the Soviet Union. lurking in 
the wing• and waiting for an opportunity to develop an effective position 
of influence in the laat year of the lJl8ll Ahmed ' •  reian, apparently felt 
that the revolution offered this chance. Accordingly, the &u•aians lent 
full aupport to the new Republic••arms, training, and economic aeaiatance. 
The SoYiet Union alao 8WUDg the satellite• under it• influence quickly in 
line on b.ehalf of the Republic. The People• Republic of China and the 
comaaniat regime• in the Par Kast alao save qvick recognition to the 
Republic. They alao lent it moral and at time• .. terial aupport; 
(2) moat of the Arab govera.ente gave the Republic imaediate recognition 
and pledged to help it; and (3) the United States could not afford to 
1tep aaide and permit the Soviet• to have absolute influence.  The United 
State• apparently felt that an American recognition of the Republic would 
at leaat protect vhat�•r American intereat• were in the area and pennit 
it to be on talking teru vitb all parties to the dbpute. lurtber con­
•iderat ion waa given to th• cl••h between the United Arab Republic and 
Saudi Arabia. In fact the �ennedy Admiuiatration hoped that Americao 
recopition of the llepublic vould leaan the tenaion• betwen K&Ypt end 
Saudi Arabia. 
After the United State• granted the Yeaen Arab Republic it• 
recognitioa. the �emen eituation thereby. wa• conaidere4 by the United 
•ationa. The latter beaaa an active attempt to alleviate the cri•i•, 
after the State Depart11ent declared to n..,• correspondent• on January J .  
1963 that "the United State•, •• an impartial friend o f  all governments 
involved, remain• convinoed that the beat intereata of the Yemeni people 
2S 
will be •erved by the diaeqagaent of foreign military force• aDd ter­
ainat ioa of thia external intervention. "8 
The Secretary Oeaeral o f  the United Rations, U Thant, di•patched 
Dr. Bunche to Yemen on a fact-finding mission. But unfortunately, Dr. 
Bunche never viaited Royali•t held areaa. Before hi• arrival in Yemen , 
the lgyptian army had ju1t vacated the Royali1t• from the city of Narib. 
He vaa given a rouaing welcome in Sana and waa taken to the newly 
"liberated" city of Mati� where he was greeted with an almost aiailar 
reception. OD bia return to America, he atateil that fightina in Yem.n 
had virtually ceaaed and meationed the appallina eonditiona of the people 
livin1 on the aoyali•t aide, which be had not vi•ited. 9 Be then vent to 
Saudi Arabia aod to the United Arab Republic. 
The reault of Dr. lhmehe ' •  and Mr. Bunker ' •  trip to Yemen, both 
of whoa had gone to Yeaea Oil the beheat of Preaident �ennedy , reeulted in 
the aeceptaace of the "cliaengaaeaent plall". Uader thia arrangement , Saudi 
Arabia aareed to atop aiding the aoyali•t• aad to deay thea the u.e of 1ta 
territory •• hoaage, while the United Arab RepQltlie agreed to withdraw it1 
troop•. It wae further agreed tbat a United Matton• Observation team 
voulcl be 1ent to Yemen to see that the clieeagag-.nt waa can-ied out. 
The f laacial coat would be •hared equally by Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab lepu�llc. The •i••ion would conaiat of 200 C•nadiana and Yugoelava , 
under the coam•Dd of a.Qeral Von Horn, who vould auperviae the carrying 
out of the diaeqageaeat plm. It waa al•o agreed that the llli.1eion would 
'lr·!· Departaant � State Bulletin, (January , 1963) , p.  91. 
9Geral4 cle Qauny, fal•al, (Jfw York. Waahingtoa: Pre4erick 
A. Praeger, Publiaher, 1961) , p. 118 . 
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remaia ill t.-en for the duration of four mntha. The •i••ion began on 
May 4 ,  196J. It vaa hoped that by Septellher the d1aen1ageaant plan 
would be a camplate aucceaa aad that the Yemen problem would be reaolved. 
However, thia waa not to be. 
Eleven veeka after the dieengaaemeut plan took effect , General 
von Horn reeigned from hie poat aecauee of fnittration and , from what he 
stated, lack of cooperation from the United Nation• headquarter• and 
inadequate provision of air and land traneport. 10 Von Horn ' •  statement 
was, more or leee, made evident by the S ecretary-General of the United 
Nations, when he reported to the Organization on September 4, 1963 on 
the functioning of the Obaervation Misaion and the terms of the diaen-
gagement . Re stated that Colonel Pavlovic and General Rikhye ( U Thant ' •  
military adviaora) had "advbed me that the present strength of the 
Mission in personnel ia adequate to carry out its tasks if theee are 
limited to obaervation and report only'� ll such a tuk could not give 
· the neceaaary and esaential help to the wounded in battle areaa, nor 
could it keep the long border line between Saudi Arabia and Yemen cloaed. 
The Misaion waa alao asked on aeveral occasions to come to the aid of the 
wounded in loyalist camps, who had no medical facilitiea whatsoever, and 
who pleaded with the Kisaion to inveatigate the alleged use of poison gaa 
by the United Arab Repub lic on Yemeni •illagea. Needles• to say, U Thant 
was still feeling optimistic about the final result of the Mission. How• 
ever, the Miaaion failed during the first four month• becauae: 
lOibid. , p. 121. 
lllY! SecuriEx CoUDC11, S/5412,(September 4, 1963) . p. 3. 
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UNYOH Obaervera have noted departure• of United Arab Republic ' s  
troop• in aubatantial number•, but have aleo aeen replacements 
arTiving, though in apparently lesaer numbera • • •  Obaervation of 
the M111ion to date indicate clearly that in aome important 
re•pecte the term.e of the diaengagement agreement have not been 
fulfilled by either of the parties. 12 
On October 28 , 1963, U Thant declared to the United Nation• that 
" I  have no doub t .  however, that a continuing United Mationa presence in 
Yemen of aome kind, but not neeeeaarily having military attributes .  would 
be most helpful and might even be indispensable to an early settlement of 
the Yemen problem, which clearly ia primarily political and will require 
a political solution." 13 On thia speech, U Thant aeked that the tent of 
the d1aengagement be extended to January 4 ,  1964. However Saudi Arabia 
was at f iret not willing to abide by a new disengagement becauae it felt 
the United Arab Republic had not fulfilled her part of the agreement . 
With all due consideration, the United Arab Republic withdrew 4 , 000 men 
out of the total force of 30,000 it had in Yemen. Saudi Arabia on the 
other hand stopped almost wholly the shipment of arae and money to the 
Royalists. It was reported that tha Miaaion was more keen in it• 
observation of the Yemeni-Saudi Arabian border than it was on the United 
Arab !.epublic ' •  wtthdraval of it• forcea. During this time the United 
Arab Republic waa receiving a substantial aid from the United States. 
Ita involvement in Yemen prompted the Senate of the United States to 
question the rationale behind the aid to Egypt. Speaking before the 
Senate, Senator Scott of Penn•ylvania said in effect: 
12Ibtd. , P• 3-4. 
ll"Jleport by the Secretary General on the Obaenation Mission 
in Yemen and Implementation of the Term• of the Disengagement , "  
Y!! Security Council. S/5447, (October 28 ,  1963) , p. 8 .  
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The United State• recopiaed the Revolutionary or quialing 
Sallal regillle in December on Nasser ' •  promiee to withdraw 
hie troops. He th• bM ll,000, and ha• now increaeed 
them to 30,000. Bia excuse was that Saudi Arabia was 
aupplyina the Govet• Mat with &rme and ..,,,nition. 
The Egyptians have been fighting a very dirty war 
in Yemen, and there are many who believe that the aid of 
$250 million over the year• to Egypt baa aaaiated it in 
preparing arme and in financing thia war, a war in which 
it bombs villages and strafes ahepharda and their flocks , 
and also drops anti peraonnel booby trapa--a war in which 
thoae who have been displaced in the Government of Yemen 
wonder why the US %.... to be paying to have them con• 
quered by Maaaer. 1 
Needle•• to say, auch heated attacks on Nasser were of no avail. The 
course of the war continued. The escalat ion of Egyptian troop• con-
tinued, and Saudi Arabian material and financial aid increased. Yemen 
remained the aame as before••divided between Repub lican• and Royalists. 
The UNYOM was renewed in May, July, and September of 1964. The Secretary 
General kept reporting to the Organization of lack of cooperation from 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. In March 1964 Preeident 
Sallal visited the Soviet Union and signed a Soviet-Yemeni treaty of 
friendship and economic and technical aaaistance. In June of the eame 
year, he viaited Peking, and a Chineee-Yemeni treaty of friendehip and of 
economic and technical cooperation was eigned. Saudi Arabia, fearing 
additional Egyptian bombing of it• territory, purchaaed warplane• from Great 
Britain, and began erecting military basee near the border of Yeaen. The 
aituation waa developing into a dangerous conflict-·• conflict by which the 
threat of war between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia was very 
poaeible. However, near the end of 1964, an event occurred which could 
14"Proceeding and Debate• of the 88th Congreaa, Fir1t Seeaion , "  
Congreeaional Record1 ,  #63, v. 109 , (Tuesday, April 30, 1963) , p. 6933. 
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bne CUaged the couree of event• la .,.._. A political aolutioa. the 
Jeddah Aarem•t, va• nachri t.•twe• Pr••14Ht .. •••r aD4 Clq Pai.Ml. 
It .ae followe4 by the Baradb COll!erenc• betve.. th• &oyali•t• aDCl the 
le,.abllcau. 
C B A P T & a IV 
O M  T O  J E l> D A H  A R D  R A R A D B  
The road to D �litieal eolvtioo of the Yemeni dileaaa v•• 
prompted by aneral nata. lacb 1.arou to a confereace •• •d• 
pout.bl• b7 ea l1.7Ptiaa allltary rw•T•••· Tia• firat lgptlu •Joi; 
military l)ffeul•e. wbtc.h waa a failwu, r.ame in P'el>ruaey .. Harcb of 1963 
duriDa tbe f .. ttaa 80D&h of I• odma. lt• failure ,.rattted Pl•T Pa•quelli 
Sp1ne111, pereODAl repreaentat ive of the Uuitecl ••tioaa Secretary a .. eral 
U That ta url7 1964 to 1aJ tile arOtllldvork for aqotlattou betvMa the 
cOllbatat•. Re veat to Calro, 'llya4b , mad Saa, propo•ill& IOPtia an4 
Saudi accept.ace of hie r...-•t to alleviate th• •ltuatloo by neptiation. 
Tll• lt63 Ullitd Aru a.,-u.c •a 4efeat led _., people to 1>eU.ne 
tbat Preald•t la•••r ao loaa•r 41ee1n4 to �ta 1a .,.... aDd that bla 
pr••eac• ua ., __ ... . political aM lllllt&rJ ltluader. l ..... r. bowwer, 
.,.. tra..... lat the trap offered bill th• opportuaity to reaala .... of 
kl• loat p .. cla• be •£fared dori.aa th• t•ndaatloa of tile Ull tJ batveea 
l11Pt -" Syria. ADI 1111t1.• •1ctory ill .,_. would u1Un bill grNt 
Wl'1ac• 1a tb• Arcia peataaila, ..S would J•opa�f.a• ar .. tly tbe 
pr••enc• of lrltaila f.a the South YmeD rederatlon. ••taa la Y-a, 
the'l'•fore, ..... r vu able at tla• aw ts-. to atlr 41ecoateat 1la th• 
South Aruf.aa federatl•. Oc�loaallJ l17Ptl.aa pl••• woulcl etrafe tile 
llOrtlMm MOtor of tbe louth Aral• fe4eratloa, tNt aner without 
ll 
reprlula froa tbe 1o7al Air force. To fttl'tber iat ... ifJ D4 &1Ye hi• 
•tr•tear �r teeth, tu lgptiaa public vu 1.. to ltelift'• tbat thelr 
aowea •t VU fiabtiaa ... ten, la ••rtlnlar, arttllh Upe¥"iall•. Up 
to tit.la time, the Ullit .. Ara ....-u.o hd awer li'ftll DY fora of 
ack!IOl'l'lMpnat of tbe •leCac• of tbe &oyaliat1. 
'I'll• ••094 -Jor l17Ptia of f .. t.ve waa undertake 1a Augwtt• 
sept .. •r 1964. Prior to till• o!f••i••• Preeldat h•MI' and crova 
PriDc• rataal hacl aar ... to Met at Alaa.tru, !17Pt . c1ur1aa th• Arab 
M •t wtlDI of earlJ ••--· The oft-1 .. wu ai.Md at adlinlAa 
a J!il USWli &la aordlea Y-. It• parpo .. wa• lr.1111q, c.,tvrtaa, or 
apelU.q the - ... ... a.,allat reet.taaee la tlM taortb. .lltho9p 
tbe a.a ... obU.pd to ft'an•t• hi• cna, the l111ttlaa troop• were 
uancc .. ahl ill bnakiaa &M loJ•li•t n•i•tac•. lt• fallen ••t be 
•ttrlJMKetl to Wok. .. ..... anpt nta •tora pract1cal11 cl"90ltillis•d 
tile otf••i•• ... ..... it• oetJecti••• •r ... babla. tanka _. beayy pu 
were tn,ped ta h•SW7 _., ... alace dleJ cwl• aot be mrwed, they wr• 
left •t� ill ..,al1at territOl'J. Tb1• •.-..Cle wae treumat1c to ... . r ,  
-.ac•M tu 1oN of w _. Mterlal •• too �Mt a IMlrda oa the alreaq 
atrai.Md l�t.- ec_..,. 
Outeida pr..-r••• ,.rttcularly frcm the Un1tM Stat••• _.. the 
... ttaa INt'wm ..... r •• fa1ul W1CtN f ... 11tle. 'l'b• Ualt•4 St•t•• bad 
tried fr• tu •ft'/ 1te1••taa to balt or at lwt e:o U11it t"• coafllct. 
11Dce ... ._ wu .., ••• , • UI aid, u w ot.11 ... to at•• cou•t, 
vtumner po••ible • to VI detada. Saud1 Arabia vaa alao ••ry •ch 
Wbaenc..S t.y tbe UI thr<M&lh the preaaaee of tile aipty Arabia American 
Oil C4>Plfla7• 1$. ... tb• .\Mrlcaa preaaur .. 11bicb reaulted ta Saudi 
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progn••i•• refom.t soeially. ec01l0llically ad politically. hW 
achool• &ad hoapit•l• were ereeted. and the Royal faaily '• budget vaa 
cut draetieally. Politlcal ,o•ltlona were DOif open to tho.• who vere 
quallfiM. Althoqh the UI ..._.. for Sav41 retoru were DOt openly 
accep&.S, tlaey cl14 eeoourap tu laucll Awoiaa 1GY•1111 •t to undertake 
poaitiYe ...auraa. 
!be r•••lt of tb• failure• of the l17ptiaa of feaaiv•• led to the 
eeetlaa 1a Aland�!& �•tvHn ... . r aa4I rataal. Altho\agh they both 
the •et.lag vae a c�uaique iaau•• by both leader• which emphaaieed the 
ueed to 1-rf.ag eout peace t.et1Nea tha two parti•• ta Ymea. "T1'1• ua the 
fir•t U.11& tut ti.\• •a:ntiau MMl officially aetDovle4aed the aiatence 
of 'two partiea!"2 The reault of the •etiq wae not appre�i•ted by all 
the partiaa. The Repuf>licao 1 .. dera felt that the United Arab 1.epuJ.lic 
gave the U.,r•••ion that R•••er waa "aelling them down the r1ver.n3 The 
aaraeaent called for both et.tee to redue• their aid to the Yemeni faction• 
and to try to create a new coalition government excluding both Sallal and 
the Iala. Thi• fol'lllUla waa bitterly attacked by Sallal, who declared that 
he conaiderecl effort• by outaide pow.r• to baraain over the future of 
Yemen aDc1 hi• own poaitlon •• repugnant.  However, th1a foraila was to be 
the sr�undwork for the Brkvit conference of lovellber 1964. 
The Alexmder agre-.nt could not he accepted at face value becau•e 
of the deep, hiatorical animo1itie• exiating between the "progr•••ive" and 
2Qid. '  p. 207. 
'oana Ad-. Scbaidt, "Yemeni Ponder UAa•Saucli Pact," ICev J.2ll 
Tille•, (leptellbeT 27, lt64) , P• 14. 
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•tT ... ltloeal" A� at•t••· Tlli• aata&Glli .. ... h•iabteae4 �,. th• t...a 
conflict. 
oa •• 11.de 1• th rnolattoaary &apt of Ill'. la•••r, 
vbicb la breald.q vltla tile tradltl�l paat ia a att_,t 
to "911.t a �etter t.t11te. Preetd .. t ... ••r la a chari ... tlc 
leader wbo•• popular ..,..1 throushout the Arab vorld 
mpttl7 ueta ht• mfttttoea f.D the IU44le lut and ta 
Africa. Tb• Pan·A�� aatloaaliat Soc1aliat mcJYellellt he ha• 
••t la mtloa ••t .,.. fonard alway• froa con .. ••t to con­
queat l••t it •lip l>ack aad collap••· 
OD the otller ald• t• tra4ltloaal Saudi Arabia, hled 
•till �J aou of th• peat A�e vbo united the k1Dg4<9 1a 
the ft.r•t two clec .. •• of till• c•tury. Saudi Arabia la • 
power ta th• Arab worl• bee••• of her contlaatal pl'opor­
ttou • which t.aelud• tile holy plac.. of hl•, and h•r 
wealth, ded.vecl from oil rweaue1 •hared v1th the Aruian 
America 011 Ca11p811J. lllUdt Arabia 1• poverfUl aleo becauae 
Crown Prince Jaiul, bnf.aa put aaide the 1Dca11petnt kiD& 
Imel, hae tlbon htuelf will las to f lpt for the surY1val of 
the tra41tioul •J•t•1 vlth bl• f•11y u nalera, act to 
refora ... �enaiae tMt ayat• aeoaomically, aocially, ad 
pollticall1. 
Th• lrkwlt Metiq ••- oe .,. ..... 21 1964. •w loyali•t• 
alMt alae bpubU.cau, with 8-41 mad lgyptiall <*•uv•r•, worked out the 
t•lW8 of the e••••·fi�•· 'lhi• waa th• fir•t tta. a formal .. etina 
betwe• aa,al1•t• •• ..,_lle•• had takea placa. OD the third of 
Th• lrk.vit aar••••t eatabl1ahe4 a ceaae- fire• vbich vu to 
of ao,ali•t• and lepubllc ... •boul4 aather oa 23, lloY..i.er. The ce••••fir• 
••• bailecl la 1'.-.n. Ia tbe citi•• of 'f .... ,.aple lit torch•• on the 
root• of houaea celebratlaa the aareeatnt. !bi• fora of celeDration ta 
traditional ia T...a. Ia 1t41 aad 1955 tb• people of Y...a celelJrated 
tlMa victorl•• of i... Ahead �•r hi• foe• bJ liabtia& torche• on the 
�. A. Scbmidt, .,. ... D1eput• i• Root .. l>ffP 1D Arn 
11.,alry," !!!'! !2m t1-�, (lept.-er 20, 1964) , p. 6! .  
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roof• of their llou••· 
Tile Mtlonal coaferenee vaa to become an f!llbryo national 
•••tlllbly vbicb would .... a pr,,.1a1oeal national executive of two 
ao,all•t• mad two Republic-.. and one f.Ddepeadeat to a.._ta1ater the 
country au plaa a Mtlou.l plebieeite, which would follow after the 
l17Ptian v1tb4Tawal fro11 !....a. loth Sallal and th• X... would •t•p aaide. 
The &oyali•t• alao qra.. to accept only one•thircl of the aeata in a con-
f erene• of 168 .teleaat••· Tllru•elptba were allocated to th• ul ... , 
three•elptha to the abeUt• • wbo would ••rY• •• the aecular nal•r•, and 
tvo-•iahtb• to other aotol... Bowwer, th• Royaliata refuaed to accept 
the lepubl1caa 4="11 that they agree 1D e4Yace to retain a republic• 
fora of pverwt. They felt that tb.e plebiacit• would decide on the 
outcome of the fora of anern rt. They alao rebaae4 to accept the 
d...ada made by the l.epultlicaaa tllat ..-ber• of t�e Bllldd lddia 1 .. 117 
be. excluded frma th• •• acwenm•t. 
It vu aareed tta.t th• conferace ahoulfl be held 111 Raradh, in 
north-•••t•n Y .... , but it vaa poatpolMCi indefiait•l::r. lacb party blamed 
the other for th• pottpoe--t of the conference. lat accordina to Dau 
Ad- ScbalAlt, the r .. eou for tb• poatpOD••t were tut IUPt ancl th• 
le.,..ttllcaaa loat iDtereat 1a ldnrit l>ec.u•• they were politically and 
ailltarily 4111barruaed at tla.at tiM. 5 lt ••• tu belief of th• !gptln 
aovel'll9ellt that ... ,. ul ... • an4 notable• la tile .. pub1iC411l file vould aid• 
vlth the loJ•li•t• if a coaf•rac• were bald at tlaat tt..  to .... tbelr 
fear, the Vn1te4 Aro lepul>ltc arreate4 •�•r•l ul ... • olDcl abeik• aad 
be... r�f f llaa t.._ lepubl1caa reat.e. Militarily the)' were eabarr••••d 
5sc:i.tdt, J!Jl!!a II!! Jl!k!ft! war, p. 210. 
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beeauae ... , a..-.11caa eol41er1 had d•f•ct-4 to th• aoyalt1t •id• after 
tbe Iman•.. off ... 1•• of Ataguat•Sept ... •r 1964. 
!la• failure to Ulpl .... t tb• ldtvit aar•--t r••ulted ta tb• 
renmptioa of tbe var vltll a 1reatel' ferocity tluua before. l•1otiatioae 
wre to reeuma, but aot -.&11 1'6S. 
Tile l17Pti.an ailitary cOlllllAnd in Y111881l resumed it• atrategy to 
kill, capture, or eapell the i... aa4I MMI loyali•t realatance in Y ... n. 
Apia it waa uanccaa1ful. The oaly ..... rable thial they acc011Pllebed 
vaa to tl1alal1b their pOllMI'. At the .-. tlme, the 1.oyalf.at• were 
lncnuiaa ta mmb•l' an4 wre gatalag ta Mterial banvan 9IM'I in 
oraataattoe. Jon•t• md l•ucll troop•, .. .. 11 .. !urop- .. rceaari••· 
wen adept la tralataa the 1'oyali•t• ia the uae of 110dena weapona. Prtac• 
Moab ud bill lhl•••in, who bee� in tile aw year th• aiU.tary c_..cler 
of the ao,altat force• , had � ... active ta eatabli•htaa a aeai•replar 
anay of eft'eral tbouamd troopa , wlltch eened •• tile apearllead for th• 
loJ•liet off ... l•• of Aprtl•llay 1965. Ill tbia of feaa1ve tbe loyallata 
.. re able for the fir1t tiM to utlU.ae th• ... of the ra4lo ad by 
ors-tat.a tlletr pl_., they were eble to atrtke at layptla po11tlou 
with •r• effectlTeDU• ..a wt.th ea.a 1UCcaa. 1'laaJ' W .... , .. to 
f.afllcat heftJ 4amll1• OD the l111Kiaa tnopa. Olac• _ta, la:rpt auff ered 
a anat lo•• 1D --.,, ._ ,  ad -· _. tlae ct.ty of •rib rewl'IMl4 to 
ao,allet i..Ma. At ti!.• _. of JUl7 lKS, r.,r••tatl.YU of tile 1.oJ•ll•t•, 
a.,ubllew, _, iM.,...•t• •t ta Tall, ,_., Arabia, .... •1 .... tbe 
Taif ._tfeeto. The latter group bM e� lato bef.na aur tba ad of 
1964. tlaeir -.rpace •lkff tile t.•1llml1ag of aa organised 1Dtal11a•t•ia 
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oppo•ed to the bpublicau, loyaU.ata, ad B11ptlana. Under lbrabha 
Ali al•Waair• they 4•1&1ded the vith4rawil of igyptlaD forcea , th.a halt· 
ing of Saudi aupport to th• �•lieta, and tbe creation of a plebiscite 
to detera.iu the political claetllly of Y--. They were man diaconteated 
with the way Y.-.n vaa balag aieueed au ver• tired of the aheddiua of 
Y--i blood. 
The T&if Mmaife1to ect&oecl tbia eeatimenta of the Yemeni people. 
lt• pr...-1• clearl, atatea tbat the ...t>era were .eetiag &Dd aiguing the 
Haaif••to "for tet1eD'• 1aka1 for her people ' •  happ1aeae1 according to 
l•laa'• aplrit to noU the continuation of the tragedy that brought 
diaaatera to t-.u, aod for our belie.f ill the ri&ht of the Yemeni 
people of ••lf•deten1ioatioa alMl the ayat... of 1overD1Dent th4t it 
chooau foT itaelf witbout esternal illfluence.u6 lta eeaential contri-
button vae the fonulatioa of a Y-.i atate 1;&lled th� "lal•ic State of 
Y...a." It would be 1 .. by a COUACi l  of State,conaiatina of eight mimb•r• , 
vbo voulct r .. reaent all th• aro.apa in Y...a. The COUDCil could have 
pawera equivalent to tbat of a pre1ldent of a •tate. A Council �f 
Kiaiatere, who•• p<N•r• would be aiailar to that of an aecutive bo&7 of 
a atate and conaiat of •iahteea to tvt1Dt7•four ainiat•r•, would aerve •• 
tbe aat illportat aroup. The third body of tile aov•rr cot would be a 
Coaeultatlve Comall, cOD•i•tiq of eight .-bar•, aa4 baviaa the uaiped 
cluti•• of dlTeetf.aa aDd helptna the Council of Hinlatera. Thia Nanife1to 
vaa •iped bJ S41 .... •r• cooeietina of lapubU.cau, a.oyaliaca, aud. an 
1ntel'IM4lat• aroup. 
37 
It .., �. ••14 tbat t•• Talf Hllalfeeto aad the ecOll09ic pllaht 
of the Vaited Arab ..,_lie pra .. t .. ... ... to 10 to J .. d•ll ad .ut 
widl ra11al. Accodf.aa to atlaoritatiff ut!Mtea, &ant lo•t altouc 
lS,000 - �etvHa Octc*el' 1962 ... Jae 19'4. laptlaa flnaacial 
p.at it a lND lt.uu.. it eou14ered 1t too mcb ot • rlak. The UDited 
Stat .. r.ihaced it• wlaeat eW to lant. TUM factfta were 1D tba alDcl• 
of botll &ant ... s-..1 Arabi.a .taea ..... r l••• 1a Jeddah. However, 
before tbe wtlDa ca.aw beaf.a, CMM .. ••tlal diM&r•••••t betwea 
ret•tioe ot ti&.• WN• ''k••U& of twa." _. raiaal held tut t.he term 
_., M eUai•t.. J.a ta.or et "tta. lt•t• of taa. "7 It ... alao l"e,orted 
tut ..... r vu ot the ltelid tbat th• 1 .. 1 ...-11can n&1- •• 
alreaq a accompU.*-cl t.t, .U it• ,.,.1tl• cCMaU mt '-• coatiaaeat oe 
.. alectioa or pleltl1tel�•·' Bow..ar, tla ... vere but •pecu.l•tiooe prior 
to tu ... ttaa. 
Aft.er two aya of ... c.s.aa, fruW•t .. ••tt ad KiDI hlaal 
aiped tbe ,, ...... ap••••t . lt ••• poaltiw _. -taat.l. lut it ••• 
to � • .Uiaterpret_. a4 .uc-.tl'WMI. ft• •ar•--t called f.-&- aa 1-· 
di.ate c ..... ftn. the ... of S_.i 8Ufp•n of Cb• loyalist•. md tile tw­
cU.at• atart o! vltWr-1 of &be llJftla torce•. A tbll'tMID 90llth ,.rio4 
•• allott .. for tlae vltMrwl of tbe troopa atoll .., rrt>ued ao.&t 
60.ooo. The •ar• .... t •• to b• carriu out ill thr .. •taa••r f1r•t, a 
7D.A.. ldmf.clt, "1�1ti.11l for .. •• Puce ill y_.., .. J.t! I2a 
tl!!•· (Au11Utt a1. 196S) , ,. 2. 
'"rataal a ... a.tu Aft•r T- talks Wlt1l .. •••r," .I!! 
I2!l Tille!, (Aul'&•t 241 1965) , p • . 8. 
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boldla& of • utioul T•mi pleltleclte wu to lte ul• to 4etenatae tile 
tne of pee ••t ,_ w to lln•I ...a c.lllrd, l&ntlaa tnope were 
to vtdulr•. hltber &IMa ..,..ll•U or tlae a.pultl1c-. •r• praaeat at 
eke wtlaa. A coalltlaa pnn mt VCNld be •elected bJ a fUt1-­
coafel'1M• oi tri.Nl leaden oi ltoth ioyall•t• aDd bpubltcw. Tbe 
cOllfereace ... u ••t la .. raA oa 13 llcwellber. leth kllal and th 
1lbo on.red a et., co tM tf.atlti... ft• ..,..11cw .,.... ac tbat tlM 
epllt, ..,_,call)' Md poU.tlall;r. a ... ot diem -r• la Bant under 
4"•t10D bee•" of tM1r o.- 4•fiaace of Sallal. Aama tb• were tu 
forMl' Pr.tar .Aimed ....... ..a Abdul ,..._ al•liyaal. The •ar•••Dt 
affor4M tb• tb• opport•it7 to ntura to 1'-. � hailed ttMa aaree­
-t. but all qrced tut lta aucc .. a d.,•ded oa Saudi ad lsntlaa 
t.pl-tatioa ot it. *87, however, coaaldere4' the •ar•••t aa • 
... ked "Mlliutoa ()f fat.lure for tb• l&JPtUaa.ut Other• coat.eaded 
tbat "trealclelat ... ••r baa cOllllltted hia preatla• oa t� eurv1••1 of a 
republic la T-.., a..t U.. f&lMl ins isted tbat tba COUllt1'7, chariDg tbe 
tl'A8ltloaal ata .. , l>e callee.I ablplJ etate of Jw. '' 10 The qre•1at 
41l1d aot _.tioa ..Utber lallal •• tbe 1.- were to vltWraw wile 1t• 
,._.,ck 1111..a.. 8A letWck tor ........  " II! J!D l&lu• 
(Auguet 27, 1965) , •• s. 
1°tl...Sr1ck &alth, '111uMr m4l Fai .. l Sip T-- Pact, .. JI! 
im t'••· (Atap•t 2s, 1t•s> . ,. 10. 
• 
..a th• lil:pu!Jllcw t..ui*' .. &Mt cbe vol'cl "ftllDU.c" ltbouW k •lat•iMd. 
-...... tbe 1o1allat• _. ta.. a...su 4•••M cut t.b• tem "•t•t• oi 
.,_" " .... atll ta.. •l•iacit• vu , ..... 
It cottl4 t.e ..W Sa !alnua duat 1•1.ul vu beiDg Mile• .. a 
1rut l ...  r ..tlo1 
bu ._ - .Utue a& llr. .. ....... ..... bJ -.CHN6Jlq 
v .. rtna cton the l&ntt.a Arrq ad PTOt•ctlq bi• °"" tbroae 
tb"'*lb hla fiuMial M&•ial• ad pell.ti.cal _,,.,rt to tbe 
b .. rdecl trlkl follWft• of Iw Mat '' al•ladr. R• hu 
atr-.stlMn.. tlae .. utica1 ..._. of Are wnb• -4 
... rat•• wbo favor nolut1cm ... onoa• rnolutloa. 11 
Other•, howfter. held that WU•n• oace apta, bad put a 1ut oae oY•I' 
rawl. 
WMtlunr tu Ja44ala aan-t would nccee• ol' DOt, ralaal u 
earl)' aa O«olter 31 ••• Miliaa lt .. a ncceee. 12 ra1N1 b-4 prow• 
btmelf to be aa utute f'-t•r aad • adept polltlciu. H• bad aot oo.ly 
illprO¥ed tU lite f.D l ... f. Al'aia itMlt, IMat Ud &lY•t .... t W8 a 
cl'WlbU .... arclaale ne'-• a - eplrtt. Kie pr .. tip aroad vu l>ef.aa 
compared to tlaat ot .......  ftl• al-.. u.u ... •1'• wiu ... QC! 
preetl.p i01' Ilia. 
OD 23 .,.,_.er cu lofallat• _. tlM kpublioa r.,r .. eacati9ff• 
.. t la lfaraA. 'rbe .... .,llcm ..... 1 ... "1 AIMtul ans= •1· lr,ot 
end •••• ..... n. IOJaluta wen at..... bJ Alllled al•Sh-1. The 
coafereac:e ba4 u lt• ....... cha foll.qwi• it- wilt.ch •r• _._ttted •• 
11" .. tTeat to ..... r." IB l!?m ttM•• (Auguat 29. 1965) • p. 2£. 
12aadrf.ck ltd.tl\ . ....... .,. Speeding T-..a Pullout. 0 !.!! 12.t! 
Times , (October 3 1,  1965) , p .  4. 
• --· of prcmotlq •olvtioa9: (1) , to d•t•raiDe the fol'll of aov•rwnt 
chariaa tu period of lapti• troop wlthdr•al; (2) , the creattoa of • 
provl•t.al c81Det to rule the couatry cluria& the temporary pl'OY1aion&l 
g0¥a1a .. t • ...S (3) , to det•llline the type of plebiactte to be held. Ill 
ad41tt• te tllue pr1-l'J factor•, the conference bad to decide on bow 
to cleal with wrled subject Mtter. Reh .. .  how to uat.fy tile acs.dala• 
tratiaee of the lepublicla ... loJ•ll•t r•a!Jlea. lecaa•• there were ao 
aaDJ .. 11 IMat atpificaat •ttn• for th- to declq, the couference 
bee-. coafued aDd bunt•... ror a vbol• month, the coafer•c• oaly •t 
three tS..., ad .turt.q thla tS. tllq aquabble4 ad accuHd each other 
of ba4 faltb. lt ...... tllat the Jeddah qn--t wu illterpretecl OD an 
illdiYidual k•S.., •• then waa u aaay 1Dterpretat1ou of it u there 
411Ml1D&. Tile 4i•banac>DY of the coofereace and it• coaheiOD were 
eaplicltl7 atate4 la a letter to PT .. ideat ... . r a.ad � rateal by the 
lapP11ca aroap: 
Uafortun&tely the &p-• .... t at Jecldah •de DO .. tiOD of 
the Baai4 ld4ia f-117, wbicb baa alwaya dividN our pa op le, 
which bu be• the caue of our trou&tlea ill the put aDd the 
pre•ent , the c .. ,. of all oar •••tnaettoa aad bloo4•1etttaa. 
U the S&lldi ad K1fft1a 1a.e1wta hfte aareed on what 
the eupe"l•i• c�ttM u. oaac .. (that th• Banttau 
wtll wlthclraw) , we ,  the repr .. otativ•• of the republican•, 
••Mrt tit.at JOU tt .. r flall reapoui'-lltty, md that th• fate 
of the Y- 1• la 10'lr h.anda. ror it 1• only you who ua 
•tleace all the weapoaa that bne be• put iato th• hand• of 
tile two part1•• tbl'Ollpaut the whole period of the paat thrM 
7 .. ra. Toa aloe• are ta • poeltloa to 10l•• the probl• 
without ilPlolviaa your owa people ta war or without aubjectllaa 
tla• to •n dutructlon aad blood•letttaa. 
'l'M HU of ,..._ were oblipd to fight OIM another , 
411,_t.. hft• b... ealtiate4 woaa th-.. ad &tw8 of •11 
kiDda ••r• offer .. by bod. aow•rmr•ta. You lane off.red anat 
8\m9 of mMJ wbleh benefited the .. rcbata of war. If JCN bad 
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the power to aake the Yemeni people fight one aoother 
we •o �•11 .. • that you have the power to ••tabli•h 
peace aad atability. 13 
The failure �f the Raredh Conference aarked • returu to var 
and the rel\mptioa of killing. lt• failure can not be aolely bl..-4 
on Maaaer. �leg Faieal, while the Karadh CODference v•• beilla held, 
agr•ed vit� the Shah �f Irma to call a M�•l .. au.Dit .. etLA&. F•iaal•• 
overture• t.o the Shah ap3ered Maaaei·. the Sheb bad for aeveral year• 
been an aaath... to Maaaer becauae be bad allowed Peraian oil to flow 
1Dto larael. ·ae had alao bef:ill vociforoualy attackt.Da Maaaer ' •  iatervan• 
tion 1D Yt191D• aact had occaail;)IUllly •lipped anna and IDC>ll•Y to the 
lloyali•ta. Th• Shah had an equal di•lik.e for laaaer t>ecauae be feared 
bl.a wroacbsnuta aad p-owlq 1afluace la the Araiaa peaiawla ad 
the Parala Gtalf. A• for Paiaal, he bad 110re to p1a bJ a Httl.-nt 
of the Y ... a coaflict , at.ace a aettltlllleDt would have •••ured bi.a of a 
••H of Mal'it7 la hi• 808tun boner. R-..er. lie probal7 realised 
that a further t .. t of atrenath would •• neceaaary and that th• var ill 
t ... a vaa liable to drag og. 14 
Por ala>at a entire rur after Jecldala. Sall.al vu kept iD es1l• 
la B&Ypt. OD Aupaat 1966, be -.ldnly retvned to Sana •cl eooa aftenarct 
h1-elf. Allri ,  loMa. an4 lTJ•l veat to l17Pt to plea tbelr c•••· Ia 
••ill they •ought to ••• .. ••er. Inateacl, tbey were not pera1tted to 
leave l11Pt• 
llruea froa sei.aut . x.p: the Upk!o!!t uar, pp. 242-243. 
14.D,Y. , P• 244. 
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&•llal '• retuna to Saa coul4 DOt bne � .... accQllfli.tlecl 
vitboyt lgyptlaa acqulaaeence. It vaa a •�l of !111>t ' •  datermlaatlOD 
to uU the mat of their po:1ltioe ill .,_ aow that c019Proai•• va. 
rul .. out. 111pttan datendaatlon to n.aiD 1a Y...a alH affectecl 
f'•i••l ' •  effort• towar.la aa I•l .. tc •11.,...nt. PToll it• earlieat 
canceptiao, tile Uait .. Arab Republic had veb .... tl7 attacked it. Row 
tMt Callfi"Oalee ••• aot forthcoa1ag, the Vil lact:'a&aecl it• verbal 
•i•aivinp ai.out a Itlatc alt11 mt. Thia rnulted ill the 
die�ppearllDC• of the pro.,eet• for an lat...ic coafereace. Paieal' •  
trip• to a1De Ialaic •tat•• could llot gather eaoup support to fora 
a •1pa1fie.at aati•l17Ptima alliance , aiDc• DODe of th• coa•eJ"Yative 
reaille• F•i••l Y1tite4 vaated a �o1lfr<JDtat1on vlth R••••r. l' The 
loyali•t• • OD their part, were fearful that a IalAaic a1U.aee al.gilt 
da11pa raiaal' • vital •pport for t!'.-. 
15*1colll &err, 1.H Ara £!.14 Var. SecOIMI 141t1oa, (toado1u 
C>xlord Vlliverait7 Preaa,-ri6�p. 150. 
C B A P T I R  V 
Due to tbe allita17 ••tbaeka tbe Ualted Arab lapublic faced 1D 
., __ 1a 1965. th• l&ntiaa llilitary C(J 'IDd adoptecl • DMI alU.t•l'l' plu 
which tb., called the 01oq �reatb pol1cy."1 Thi• policy n• alMd at 
wl.tWnwtaa tbe &anti• troop• from th• bighlod• la tbe GOrth. we•t, 
.... eaat of 'lemea aad C01aeeatret1D1 tluml OD th• three city•trlaaal•: 
saaa, lludeUu. &114 Tau. Sucb a coeceatration, they hoped would Mlut 
of botb the l11Ptiaa ... tbe &epubllc ... troope. Alona with thi• pollcJ 
the l17Ptl.u attempted to all .. iate the cliecoatat v1th1D the 
lapubllcan r_.. bJ calliag Sallal to calro AIMI r.plac1D1 him. temporarily 
wltb firat lloll1aa &IMI tbea Oeaeral Aart. Tbla atep ... adopted becau•• 
th• 1.epUbllca 411•ba1W08J bad created wbat beu.a koowa •• th• "Third 
Fore•... lt 1• appropriate to trace the comtDa of the tbln force in 
order to Mk• the UDderetaadiDa of tbe laptiaD policy 11e>re plau•ible. 
!be loJ•l1at victori.. aad the �reak4own of the lrkvit .. etlDI 
, ... nid .. ce of a •jor rift 1a Republic• ranka. Although there ha4 
D•ea diea&r• .. ••t• ...,.. tbe a.p.abllcaa• la the paat OD t�e role aad 
fanctloae of tbe Uait•• Ar� lapuit11c 1a t...a. thl• waa the fir•t ti.lie 
that auc:b 4iffer.acea bee ... vldely e.1deat. 2 
low •· lolllll4t. twas IJ!! pPDon Wtr, p. Z74. 
'Is! 12!.\ J&e•, (l>ec.-er .z7, 1164) , P• 7. !••hWtoa P09f • 
(l>ec.-er a. 1964) , p. t. 
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0. Dec ... r 11, 1914, a ·ea, z.Nll'l, -" Al•lr,al natp .. 
epill•t Sall.al ' •  ••t•rltJ. lallal, wtlo 
•tat• of wr1eac7. le ta•• • aut1ar•t ... iu&wct.t that tb• 
fot"Mr alaiatera of tlae eaf.Ml k trW tor "crl.•N apf.aat tlae atete. ,.3 
fti• 4fflnatt.oa 1t7 lallial lt•wlltt lato ••taa tile dalri force, 111lldl W 
it• 1te1t••aa• u .. l'lJ • lMJ. 
u•l• end9t1Al• ta .. ta • cMlr oppoattioa to tlae ft&iM• ef prniou• 
i.... were C011Cened. n., .- h'o9 th• rmk• of tbe .. ,..lie aa .. 11 
•• from thoea .-0 bad Mt atwa chair alleaiw• to tbe ...., an•nmmt. 
I..,aal aM llaN• are � -. laipl7 napectecl _, illpon.Dt ...-11caa 
Wllao dU aot cbertall tlMa ... uttJ of laU.al ... vlao v .. t .. to l••• th• 
•tlaoritJ of dae IJait .. MA .. , .. u.c I.a U.. UiplmatatlOla ot ,olici•• 
.... •1 tM ...-iu. ftMI we pomtaeat wrn••r ot the tlltn fone. 
8o •lAI aoc ceme froa tM ..... of tbe ...-11cw, 1• Dr.tda al-Watr, 
aepbw o! AW.llala A1-VM1r, -. ... the l .... r of tla• 1941 rnol•tloa. 
poeeQle, to .-race it. lowwer, da.•1 ven 41aappo1at..S. TMJ i.-. 
ta.a ltp .. lt� •1m•aiatrat1oa iaeffieleat ... tbe Valt .. ...-� liepabllc'• 
ao,alt•t• _. tbel'� _. tile var. 
3-.fnd w. Wwr, l!tftrp Jwai l!l!·l!!t· (aaltt.ore1 
Jobe 8opk1u Prua, 1967) , P• 215. 
., 
tbe pn•tia• of the toJ•li•t•. llou of the ioY•U.at• Jo,._. tile tbln 
fol'C•· ftq •r• •Je,tq aucceHlve polltlcal ...S a1U.t•l'7 1•iu at 
tll• _,.... of t1l• ...-110 •• tile Ua1te41 Arab .. ,...lie. 
P .. rtq tut the pn.tlp of the ..,Ulf.c vu oow at aa all· 
tt• low ..,.. t1l• T-l•• tll .. •l•••• _. fullJ -r• of tile lacl"•••ila& 
oppoeltloe to tile coat.._ect pre•mc• of lara• tllillb•r• of l17Pti• troop• . 
Sallal dacldM to att_,t to aol•• tile pTObl-. OD 11. April. 1965. lae 
...  11o1a-... ........ 
.. tloaal Pde• Coafereace of ...,_.lie• 1 ... en to be beU at 11e1r. ia 
110rtbera y_., to dad.de to fom • apeclal c�tt•• to ..U peace 
cwertur•• to tM ao,alf.at lea4ara. ..t tlilf.a Cft'art.un 4141 not U.e tlae 
_,port of eltber lallal or ••••r. X-.i•t•lJ after the coefernce, 
•r• laJPtiaa troop• 'llCWM loto t..... .... ••• loRecl to nelp, and 
lallal appolatM atS...lf •• fnaier.4 Tbu n•t waa aooa follOlfM b)' 
.oluatary •ile of thlrt,-anea 18pubU.c.. !Mo the All r•t• of aa,taae. 
Th• fiaaco of tb• 1.e .. tr Coeferaace we• tb• raapoa•t•111ty of 
t1ae Ualt .. Aro lapabllc. Por poU.ttcal _. alllt•rJ" r .. aou tlaey 
cnat.. c ... tou .... aai•tJ la the c•fereace � t.acr .. •iaa th• appre­
bwiou of the le,Uliea clel•a•t•• coaoeraf.aa tla• !nrvace nle.S 
Tiley •t• aot 1Mlllt the lepublie to recoacile it• probl ... vtth the 
RoyaU.ata. Bowwer, ••• re•lpatioa and lo)'aU.et Maea••••• ta tbe war 
41!! 1213. Iimea, (.ha'IM 29, 1965) p p. 8 .  
S.lbdu al• Illah Ab4u Allah, geltpte ti tbe X9!! anolust.99. 
(D .. acuai D-.•cu• Palace, a.d. ) ,  p. 201 ta Arable. 
fore .. Bant to Melt .. tott.tt-.. ft• lgptia• wre .,. vonl .. Uout 
tlaelr p091t1• ta T-. •lela lat•l1 bAMl -.._. quite _.tMle • 
....... vu .- beiaa ,_ ... to ailllltt Cbat T- ... la .... of • po11t• 
lo•l aol•ti.oa. It.a prwiou et....t lwMI Mea to ac:laine a 11U.itar, •ietol'1 
_. couoUAace tile ..,.lie. Wllea he .. ttala poU.01 fat.u.111. be 
•=•••• lt la ta.or ot a ,olhical aoi..1-, l ... iq to tlae Jedda 
fte dlin force •ee•• a ••outeu.rr• _._, altu cbe 
..,•11.w nwllecl tt.elr 4lfferw... Ibrabm al-Wair �-- the 
apob 1 r• of tlae tllln fofte. Accol'dt-. to Ilia, 'fWD could •11 atta1D 
puce it Mtla ac..-uca, ttae ...-u.cw _. .,,alle:ta, wue wt.111Da 
co al•• up tlMlr •on •1• hr ulU.aa .,_ a "a.public" or a "Si ... oe. " 
Y-, ...,_er, CNPt to ... to.-111 called � lai.tc Stat• of 'fwa, n 
aw _. .,..nwMI � ta.e Aarta 01' 1•1-ic Law. The tlltn tore• hu 
alao ....,. .... lt• •t.,l�• a.er the pTe•-.c• of l17ptf.aD lore•• 1a 
Twa. 1au.11 Aral.a ttaa•IM tlN thin fo� oould INt a ueiul ..,._.t 
to belrt...  aad tlllCCNft ... tbe lof•liace to come to ten. vlcb t1l•. 
Rwer, tlM tlalrd ton• 4W eot s-..,•• pottltlvelJ' to ,_., 0"9rtwee, 
tur•bf loelat tile f iDIMial aw it had a.._ to r••l•• f�• ra1u1. 
'l'bia 41A aot, bawner, Wtaa • _. to tu -.m1at ,  wlalch 1• •till 
aoU:n a..at weak. 
'ftte �ecall ot lallal la lMS to &IJPt wa eouldeNll • •tsa tlaat 
-.... ,... clieaatlefi ... with hta. lallal -. Dot a colort.1 peftOD, aor 
vu u fOll'lln or c-..t.-t. 7 Bia wecall •• al.o tboaabc to It• part of 
'*-tn4 w. WenMtr, !p!!p Jeat !!J:!·l!§!, p. 219. 
Jo- A. lc..Ut , T9!1t D.! U!k!o!p !!!Ir p. 27S. 
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• -..1tt• •ar••••t b7 rataal ad ....... t.o ._.. a coa#•l•t ..,.t 
to wttWr• betb lallal .U •l• ... I' &a. tb• a_. of "•ta.• htla bad 
ltec-. • .,.ol of atal.ate. Th• aap8U .... • ... tu .. c 11041erat••, 
re61H4 to •• eOMU.r tile n.ot••t ,oNiltl11�f.u o! taci.staa tile 
1•14 Mella faailJ 1a ..., - arr-._.. OD &U otber -.., t ... 
ao,all•t• reject.. _, 8fte tORM• pemf.ttS.C lallal to plaJ Q7 role 
1a a COllfromi•• an•r•••t. tbt. 4udlock prnalled at tile 8ara6 
CGaf•we.ce. Tlaenfore, Wlail• Sall.el ntnat .. to C.iro, al•a .. r .,..t to 
Tall, .._., Ar alt ta. 
1a Aqut lt6t tu ao,all•t• •t ta Tait wtta. IUq t•1••1 _. 
ucuu.-.. • •rale owll, .. laa u. •r 1 t• • Uld.t .. wrc1a7. 
Pwer ablft .. iato tu had• of Pl"lac• ti>lar td bl.II lhl•••f.a who vae 
e�wnder-ta•cld.ef of tbe ... ten MglOll. Prt.c. Mr* •• vu • -.r-
.. u.c 7omg -· 1llao Ud acllin .. the n.,.ct of the .,,.11.at trlb••· 
rroa tbl• •••t ... .,.._ . "f7 ... ort•t fJ.pre. 
tlM ••fenace .a.c:Ue4 co op.a a 1-r•l of feul••· Tld.• 
4ecl•1- we Mc>pt .. a..-.. tbe .,,alht• W loat tile .tlltary ••••wm 
*icla lla4 i .... tu s�..._ to adopt tlM "10lll atnatll toliey." Tbe 
lack of ldllta17 c.afU.et ... _...._ dl• 1o7allat trl.Me natl•••• aad 
tbeJ ,...  aati.Ga. .,... ... tla• cl.ct•'- of the c.tenece -� 
faiaal fo� MWUal re•HU• tint of aJ.l, fal.Ml ... raaU .... Uet IMa 
4U eot .... tbe ..,all•t• u ..a aa th.,. ..... Illa. a..li Anbia W 
ialerull.7 nloma• _, of it• tutlwt'-8 ud W ilIIJroY• die U.•111& 
.-.titw of l�• ,_,1.. llo 1-.u 4W 1t "-• co wlt fow Datt .. lt•t•• 
w--a-t to nfom. la Id• f.atUWioMl tl'ipa altnM• hiaal W 
8 ..1!14• • p. 27S. 
c ..... t•• relat1oas witll tla• Shah ol Ir•, liq au- of llo'fOCco. K£aa 
Hu••la of Jorda ... Pr••ldeac JobaltOD ot the Ullite4 Stat ... MlU.tarily 
Jae vu al>out to be atr-atJi...S. ID Decemer, lt6J, S-41 AnbiA 
-ao�lete4 . 4eal with lritain for tu purclaue .u wtallatioa of 
t1lirt1•..,.n -'>11• 'ftauDdenin aroulld•to-atr 111••11•• a4 to put iato 
opnatloa t• J•t U.ptera •t a bu• ... r tlae boner of 'I-. 17 tile 
at.Ml• of 1966, t1ae lutallatt.c. vaa .. ul7 fio1•e4. Tbla ia lt••lf 
an• teudl Arata tr••••oua lnerqe. It ao loqer W to ..,_. oa 
tlae America ur fore• co ••w�nt• to l&nt tbat Seudl Arabia 
aoftl'•ipty would tte •I.at&..... lnd1 Ana.ta aow eould d«f...S it• on 
tenitol'J with tlla tnu1oraq IM1f of •re__, pilot•. Dd tb•l'f on 
pilot• were t.elq tl'al.DM. 
n. Mc_. nua raiaal •1• 110t wiab tu BoJ•llet• to UDdert.U 
• 1eural of t-lY• vu 1Mo-• the &l)'pti• fore.. ba4 reliaqulall.S ....,. 
ar... ta tbe ... ten _. aol"tMra part of T-. Tbla ,... tile .. loaa 
a.natb ,ollq." Accon1ql7, u loaa u 0.1 wen acwf.Da ltack, J'ai .. 1 
4114 aot v-.t to iltterfen. ?Illa pollcJ M7 bQe alao t.MD adopted 
a.ec-• of tile mia••-t a,, l .. 11Dd that a., 1968 lt wulcl nacuate 
it• !orcu troa .W•. Tile coaceatratla. of tba l&JPtla troop• vouU 
belp tllem iatazveee lll Mea. auaer would, t-..  b• ale to wi.tch 
•trateo • ._..r the " lOlll breath" fr• aorth to eout1'. At th• .... ti-. 
Wa1M1 414 aot -t to ... .. ..... ..., further ltecmae he f .. nd • 
l.,,Claa nprlNl mv. woul• burt Id.• coatr,. Oil *1 1 . ..... r vened 
laudi Al'Mi.a t.Mt &mt wou1d f.a\'ad• ... OCQIPJ part• of Seu41 Arabia 
1D the neat of _, AATU•loa 1Dto T- tr• 1...a1 terri.toq. Be vaned 
tbat lf JN"k• ._, laa.dt or lof•ll•t act1ou • &antua fore•• wo.U ••is• 
49 
the Saucli Arabf.u town• of Qf.&an and lfajrn, which be claiMd wre once 
part of Yemen ft4 tlleplly se1aed by Saudi force• th.1ny yHr• aao. 
Wblle .. •••r vae tbreateataa, the Unttecl Stat•• llad beu trytna to 
perauade both le4Mler• (P•i••l and •••••r) to return to th• eptrlt of the 
compromiae that ha4 produce4 the Y ... a peace pact the prevloua fall.I 
Th• lgyptla adoptiOD of the "loea t>reath poU.cy" .ay have bee 
motivated bJ the defeat• they bacl euffered ueder 1.oyali•t hand1 or by 
tile "recopltloe that n ateaalYe area of iaecce11ibla tenaln without 
effict .. t co mtcatlooa aad adlliatetrative n.tvork ... aest to 
lapo•alble for a llaf.ted .-.r of trained Ma to coetrol."10 The policy 
alao tllplted that l&YPt toreaav the hopel•••• .. • of a 11111tary victory 
ower all of Y....a. 1 1  
Pat .. 1 waa aware of tbeae thtag1, aDd he vaa alao avara that 
aa lona •• he held the pur••• the 1oJ•lf.1t• could llOt acc011pllah ... ch 
aad tbat tile offn•l•• ahould be del.,-.S m:atll a better opportalty 
preallQt.. lteelf. Therefore, raiaal vaa wllllaa to caaiproal••· The 
loyali•t• 11&at cooperate with the th1r4 fore• aD4 th• Sultana tmd Shleka 
of ttae loutll Arabia Pe4•r•tloa, vbo were, lllte the tblrd force. at.l· 
817Ptlaa. Tile Ma probl•, althoup a aq&T•t• 1atu• fro11 th.a Y....-
coofllct, anenbel•••• i• a aicroco• of tu y_. altuatloa. To wader• 
etalld it• bipol'taac• ia tlae O'lerall T..al coafltct ,an ••laatloo of 
clevelop11nt1 Sa Adu le W•• .. "1· 
, .....  " Waru I• Will lnad• lf ,_., Inter.fer• ia T .... ," 
!!! Im !Wt, Ola7 2, 1966) , P• 2. 
l'M.atre.t w. v ... t", Jlof!D tw1u ltll•lt66, p. "'· 
llJ!!U. • P• 22,. 
la 1139 oe port of Ada ,,.. capt•l"M bJ the lrttta !na &be 
1.i� of IAllf.J. Later u., .wed iate tlMt lliateru.At wbicll New lmalwD 
.. tile Men frot•torate. ID ltJ1, Ad.a ... tbe rrotec�rat• ..__. a 
Crow Coloa,. Db e-. abGlllt cb.-oup tbe ruU...tioa • tile pan of th• 
lritl•la aatlaorl,l•• tU& la oder to retala � _. tlM Protectont••• 
poeltlft .... na for th• cnatloa of lateraal peace _. .._ritJ .. ,,.. 
Med..S. 'Illa '811o-Y••l tr•atJ ot frt..tnf.p la 1934 ...  til • po•aittle. 
'l'b• r .. tot'atioa of puce la ICNtla Arabia ,,.. •&•hrW ill the late 
1950'•• lw Alm•• niutat.S Id.a clAS. ClftY Ma ad dae ProtecstOl'atu, 
_. • ld.Di.,..r �roka Od Mt1Mm bill _. t ... lrttl•b tore .. 1D Ad•. 
!Jae reaalt• •w aoc Maetit eldae-r •taaoai•t, IMlt tc •u force dMa 
aritleb •tboritt .. to onae a t•erati• la ltff. aalll 4dea _. tlua 
hotectont• "" .,. called dae Soutla Arabia r..leratioa. Aloas wltb 
dale cleYalo,...t, a -· rlallla llt•rat'J elite 1Naa co fona ta Adea. 
They "" DOt oqaiaed _. llaad little proapect of futm 1af W-.. 
Yet tbe)' aaltat• aacl "- to tenoriae tlae lritia •tboritie1 ill Ma, 
_. tbe Bept .. er 26, 1162 T--f. ... obatioa afforded tU. t'be opportualt7 
to •• T-. u a bu• !or cralab'I for .-.enl•• ect•. 
Wbea t.ba lrittah audaorltle• created tile toutll .,_ h'aratloll, 
tbq 4ecland &Ut tbeJ ... 1• r•taia tlwatr wa acwenJ.pt7 ower Ma 
Colo1a7 Welia1telJ. !be Wioulleta ill .._ CIMD HIM to IWCIUp al'OUDd 
tbe People' a 'fr .... UDi• Part1 aM tbe Meo tT&4lae Ueioa 0G811'••· 'ftMt .. 
two partiea t.ored t• .. •••c• _. .,.tual .. 1t1 vltb Y-. ID • 
att..,t co n• cu rialaa rwol•ti.ar, tU., tb• arltt• aw•t11 •t 
dec14.. to •rs• Ad• ColOll1 4lll4 tbe aw feduatloa iato OM atate. '!'bey 
U,.. tla1a -.w •••rae the Mtloealiat• •'"' • (Wenll fedel'al 
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Mt1Y1t1 ... 97 l'LOIY (boat for tbe U..eratloa of loutb y_..) aa4 th• 
llLf (Jlati.oul U.O.r•tloa ft.i) . Tb• l&tt•r c-. 1Ato eaiateDC• I.a 1963 
..ea11e *"• tomK ... c¥ .. t .. ta 1919. ... •• r ,_. bi.a backSaa to fLOIY 
llac••  it vi ..... to mite ia HM ioaa or wdaar witll 1'wa OBCe 
iadep•d•c• w acld....S. ac..n, &ant ta 1'67 •itch.eel it• hpport 
to dte llLf ltec••  die JIU waa mn 4mMdtaa. _. lt• terrorut act 1.vl­
tlH Wft mi:e pl'ftalat. 
n. lrltla ao'ffll at W • lar.. !laacial eta• to tile ar ... 
lt• oil co14 •t .. ' •ed about ..-laalf of tbe feT•iaa Gulf oll produc• 
tt.oa, aM MiUle lat ell wu •ital to it• •OllOllJ• Bovaver, wh11• 
ecllllowledalaa laer iat•re•t•, lriuia �ecns �r• of the arnltJ of bet' 
pr...-e. ID oN.r tlaat •"- Iii.Pt ... , • .s.ra aom fora of Latlueac• ill 
lwtb uau. ll'itaia ••lar.. 1a 1K6 tlaat •• voul• vitlacltaw her 
fore .. from Mea � 1961. Tllia 4leclaratloa cw u a aurpd.M �•c••• 
ot lta S...11 .. fiaallt7. Tbe uU.ouli•t• were ..WUed 1D tllelr bovl' 
of ..,.nat trlmpll. MialJ ltecauaa of tb• ecowle dlUJ.aalti•• Ma 
wo.14' fUMI ica•lf ta alter tbe lritiab 4eparture.13 OD th• ot�r b&Dll, 
..... I' r•Joicd at die .... Ha Md loaa oppoMd •rlt1.ti pnaeace ill 
Ad• _. &o.tb M:ala. Be •• 4eclare4 tbat h• vu pnp&Te4 to •t.ay 
lD t- for tv•ty , .. ra if HM•aary, lmpl71a& tut ha ••• prepared 
to a--la la ,_ .. loag .. tbe lritlab ware etat10IMl4 ia Aratt 1-Mt•. 
ftaT vu aot ale to ... taia 't• poaitioa 1D South y.._ 
bee••• of it• policJ of _._..tloa _. ltec••  lt ,,.., diaoqaised. 
oa tu otb•r aa.a.&, ti.. m.r ... a 41aeipU.a .. ad aipt117 oraal.sed 
party chat ballned eanaa•tl7 ill vio�e. Mcodlaa to lt• Ueoloo. 
,, 
the llU 1>•11....S that Ylolaac• in th• att-.,t co will lDdependeac• wa1 
a vital crit•l'ia ... ehoulct IN u...a •1•iaat .., •1-t oppo1.. to HLr 
poll.cl••· .._ •• it .... vlolace •aatut the ITittab, the l•lt .. and 
lhef.k8, _. CJtber utlwlt•t• who were la •teaar••=t •ilia it• pblloeo­
phJ. •1 .... 1, 1961 it 1'M rout .. ft.OIT ad .. tatt.aa .. lt••lf •• tlHl oaly 
power ta Sonbena Anbt.a •1• to tall• G'rer •• tbe lrtttn clepart ... 
V.llke rtOIT the llU 4oetl aot eout•u ll•••u _. .. •••rl• an 
ef feeti•• rall7iaa fOTce for Aral•. Accordtag to th•, .. •••r l• oaly 
another Arab leader ,.,.. iat•rut• ta South A.rota b aot ••lu .. lliply. 
Tba Ad• pl'Obl•, like th• one ta ,.._, wu eout,.rel pot•tt.ally 
daa •rou•. Tb• fact that lritala ad !ape were faetaa eaela otheT aad en­
cour•1illa their .,. .. ,.cti•• alll .. to taterfere with the pre•eoce of the 
otber, cou14 1 ... to a coaholltat1oa ttee.e• tile two. Altlaoualt th• Gaited 
State• had ett..,t.. to .,,.., th• piroltl• ta loutb Ar .. la with U..tf fereaca, 
lt wou14 DOt have be• able to •iatala ta.at attit9de 11 a confrontation 
betw .. tbe Ualt .. Al'D ...-iu Dd ll'ltata oenn-M. The lo.let U.ton 
woa14 th• hn• i.e• •llaed to ccae to the al• of tlae UAA _. tb• '1-­
..,_ llc, •inc• lt Md '-••t .. too be..,llJ la ltoth C4'1Dtrl•• to all• eucb 
a 1-eac.mt Co M Jeo,a�lae4. 
"'9 a.,,cu. wltWT_.1 flt• the u•t•n nd aortlMara part• of 
'!- ta tile UTlJ part of 1166 u...-.... tile loul •tlloTitl••· Tiley wre 
"-11!.at .. tato Hiq toned to ...,, tbe "1-a 1'natb poU.c7." The 
a.public_. had 1IOt � ... too apfTeeUtb•• of l11PtfAa pnanee ... help. 
Alao, then .,.re too _, �le• fl'om the ..,..11ca raaa ••..,ills die 
nlctloa of l&ntlaa pioueDCe. Qeaeral Am'1, We> bad l»HD pro-lant!Aa, 
joined th• rasak1 of the dl••ideata. ... •• r aaw felt the time had come for 
a ebolMom vi.th tbe a.,ublicaa and tha RoyaU.ata. 
OD Aupat 1966. 8al1Al vea ret11t'BM co Y-. ti• remn ... 
IM>t welcomd bJ ta.. ...-u.o...  Gaual Amt �rlM ta ,,.ta to keep 
Sellal fl'09 la&Mf.laa • s .. aiyPOrt. SR be vu tlmarted 1rJ c ... BIJl*l• 
fore... Amrl, llcme•• ...S lrJ•i aaked to fly to IOPt to P'"••mt tla•l'f 
c ... to ... ffl'. They wre ar� .. tbe1r n•••t. ID Cd.l'O, thq fouad 
t"-aelva ...S.r boeaa• al'reet . ..  ltlaer ...  er aor 9'1 ldp lgptla 
pvu11 •t �tflclal wou14 ... th•. ID the •ntt.e. &allal ••t about 
coeaolid-0tlq "1.a poaltl.oa I.a 1 ... tty ltriaalaa to tM top - who had 
.__ b1a coutat aDd .... 1tl.U loyalty 1a tll• put, _. �, ,.rain& 
� rwtalaa diaaUeat ...,.llcw. 14 lllay top rukt.c _. luaar 
otflc1al• iD th• lepUU.e •t vitla Sall.al • •  -aer. 1-. ware killed b7 
f iria& ...... after dley bad �... tried 8Dd fOUDCI .. i1t1 of treaaoa �, a 
p-.opl•'• CCMtr&. Sall.al apr ... ternr aed fear 1a ..,..llcaa 1...  Th• 
,.ra• coat1....S iato tM fint llODtb of lt67. 
hrlq the ,.ra• (1,7 lallal• tu &antt.- r•••* tla• var with 
orucallt1. Tia• 1Dt ... if1catlOll of lt .,.. aille4 at 9b90l•t•lJ ,._.ltablna 
tla• ao,alt.t re•i•& ... • ._.. ... iaa lt oac• 8IMI for all. Aerial � .. •1'41Da 
o& ao,allat poaltloaa ll8d ta.a• b� a daily routtae. Alolaa with tbi•. 
tlaen vu • iaceu1fieat1oa of pnpaa.U. aptaat tlae U.lt .. Stat ... 
K11•t eDll lallal claar• .. that Uaite4 lt•t•• ree0119it� of the a...-lie 
••• a -.., ...a cut it •• vonlq ta nlluloa with Seudt Arabi• 
•a•lut tbe l.epubl1c. 'fh•J alto cla.JMd that the Ullited State• vaa 
att911Ptl111 to da•tl'OJ tba bpubllc with tlae help of Pa1u1 aDd the Shah 
S5 
Ille retua ef lal.lal _. tu n• 1tioa of wu .... .., fora ot 
aqotiat1• or C� mpoaaible. 16 Ilda ..... clMI' ...... l&nt 
oace •Pill ra1 rd tbe •• of po1eoa - u • prlM17 J.agndleat la tk• 
.-.. ... of th• &o,all•t•. fta ••• of fOlMa - � llJPC f.a 1 ... we 
flnt ue41 ill lt6J. la 1967 •sntia ue of it bee- fla&rat ad 
&oyaU.at c ... _. Yilla-. 
TM H.rat ... ot poieoa IU "J lent 1a ,_ ._. r.,.rt•• to 
bn• tu• place oa � a. 1963. kt tlala we aot Y•T1f1d by ..., 
1ataraatloaal -.-1.utl•• a-ner. report• bJ Jwnalf.•t• _. otbne 
att .. t to tile uM •f poiaoa ae• oa twal •lll•a.. after thell' a.SM• 
tleu ol Yicu.... lleuac ... of t•lc P• 414 aot occur •tll J-.TJ 
lt67. Oil ..... l'J s. tla• t.a of &ltat. um of ·-· ... rau.d �y 
l11Ptlaa *••• ¥bf.ch •l".,P•• tM l•tlaal ... oa ta.. vlll•&•• 1&1111.aa 
aout two -..red t••�ltat• •loaa wltb •-.•tic •1ml• aod liYHtocu. 
th.la acQIMtioa '' tla• 187•li•t• ad .. 11 �-. no 11w .. c1pted tb• 
rald GD Kttaf, ... 4ea1 .. ... 11.cltlJ �1 tlae l17tti... autborltl••· OD 
11&1 10. tu villaa•• of Oalaar U4 GUata la Wedi a1rae. aortb of saaa . 
were ralcl .. _. ... t.Olllte4. lwatr-flwe people wen killed. ft• 
Ualtu •t'-• •rely lporM tlut cG11plaiata. •t•tba tbat th• tact• were 
ill 411•,.te _.. trutll c.U •t ate aaurtas...cl. 17 
15..li!t• • P• 285. 
16t"l11Pt'• !AM Duck." lc••ttt, (Sept.-er 24. 1966) ,p. 1237. 
11Dw Ada Sc .. 1 •t • ii• &!1· , p. 264. 
It wa• only in July , 1967 tlaat th• truth came out. 
In it• report oa tile ... of poiaon gaa in Yemen, the InterDational 
led Cro•• verified the rumor• ef the uae of poiaon gaa on Yeaen •• valid 
truth. In it• report, ,_llahN t.y the •w !.2!:! Tiu• on the 28th of 
July, 1967, the ICBC re,.n .. that the miaaiov. examined four aunivora 
of the village of Gahar. 
The four survi•o�• vile were in the contaminated area are 
all in pain from their eye1 and almost blind. All have pains 
in the cheat and noae laaa 9DJ wounda .  
The doctors caunot teetify t o  an air raid with gaa bomb• 
of which they vere not peTaoaally witne••· On the other hand , 
they stress that all the evidence lead• to the cy1clusion that 
edema wae caused by the breathing of poiaon ga1. 
The United Stat .. Ila• pr .. ioualy •oiced it• diaapproval over the 
neva of the uae of poiaoa 1•• in Yemen. It vaa clear froa the outaet 
that only lgypt poaaea1 .. 1•• ch .. icala. After the ICBC report , the 
United State• State Depart ... t •pokeaman, Robert J. McCLoaky , declared 
that ''we continue to iJe daeplf diaturbed by the many report• concerning 
the uae of poiaon g.. agaillat civilian• in the Yemen. Thia govermaent 
condemn• auch action aa lahUlll&lle and entirely contrary to the law• of 
nationa. 019 However, aa diaturbed as it vaa , the United State• did not 
wiah to raiae the queation of the uae of gae in Yemen to the United 
Rationa. It felt that reapon•lbility ought to be handled by Saudi Arabia. 
However, S&lldi Arabia did not want to p�••• for international action 
againat the United Arab Republic for it• uee of poiaon gaa becau1e the 
lS"Text of the Red Crose Report on Uae of Poison Gas in 
Yemen , " New York Tim.ta , (July 28 , 1967) , p. 8.  
19u s ia di•turbed l>y Yemen Report a of Poison Gas Uae," 
!!!! !2!! Times, (July 28, 1967), p. 1. 
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Arabs hacl reeeutly been defeated by Israel. Jordan, Syria, and Egypt 
had lo•t a portion of their territories to Iarael. According to the 
Saudi Arabian aovermaent ,  the attuation of the Araba at the time was 
gra•e. Ivery effort had to be taken to aaaure some form of unity within 
the Arab rank• ao that Israel would not be able to enjoy the fruit• of 
it• victory. To bring the issue of poiaon gae to the United l•tiona 
would only anger the United Arab Republic aud negate whatever has been 
accompliehed towards better understanding between the two nation•. 
Jamil M. laroody, Saudi Arabian representative to the United •ationa , 
clarified hi• government ' •  policy by stating that "in the inflamed 
situation in the Kiddle !ast, this would not help mattera . "20 Saudi 
Arabia bad euggeated that a United Nations investigation team be sent to 
Yemen to esaaine the alleged use of poison ga• . But the United Nations 
did not undertake such a venture. At that time, the Arab-Israeli problem 
was in need of immediate attention, and it was imperative for the United 
Rations to concentrate its energy on resolving the Arab-laraeli conflict, 
which it viewed ae more dangerous to world peace than the Yemeni dilemna . 
The l&YPt•in "failure in Yemen contributed to its shift from Bab 
al•Handab to aharm al-Sheikh in an effort to bol•ter her preatige while 
atmultaneoualy atrildag a blow against Ierael. "21 The defeat of Egypt by 
the hand• of larael forced Naseer to aeek a disengagement from Yemen. 
Militarily and economically, Egypt could not remain in Yemen. It• Sinai 
oil refinartea were taken over by I�rael and the Sues Canal waa closed. 
20"saudia, to Preserve Arab Unity, Won ' t  Presa Poison Gaa 
Issue ." !!! � Times, (July 30, 1967) , p. 6. 
21Aaron S .  Klieman, ''Bab al•Mandab: The R·ed Sea in Transition," 
Orbia, (Fall, 1967) , p. 761. 
58 
Two of it• moat prised economic poeaeeaione were no longer under it• 
control. Thia in itaelf ahattered the economic progre•• Eaypt had 
attained. Militarily, it• army had been dealt a eevere setback, and it 
had to reoraaniae aad atart abnoet anew in rebuildillg it. Thia required 
money and other nation• willing to help it regain loet revenuea. There­
fore, Saudi Arabia waa needed, vboae financial help had to be given. 
The UAR knew full well that it would have to abdicate aomething in order 
to receive from Saudi Arabia the eaeential financial backing it deaired, 
hence the meeting between Paiaal and Naeaer at Khartoum in the Sudan. 
The �artoua meeting between Paiaal and laaaer vaa another mile• 
atone in Arab negotiation•. The Jeddah Agreement failed. Hope was now 
expr••••d in Ih&Ttoum. In the face of defeat, the Araba wanted more 
than anything elae to reconcile their difference•. In �artoum, the 
Bgyptian repreeentative auageated that the Jeddab agreement be revived . 
Saudi Arabia wa• willing to go along with the euggeation. They agreed 
that a three power cOD1Dittee would be formed to euperviae the withdrawal 
of the Bgyptian army from Yemen. Faiaal in turn agreed to halt the 
ailitary and financial aaabtance that he wa• giving the Royali•t•. 
Morocco, Iraq, and the Sudan were choaen to be the three nations named to 
the auperviaory coaaittee. Aa a monarchi1t, Morocco waa preaumed to be 
pro•Royali•t; Iraq, a• a Republic, was pro-Republican; and the Sudan, 
aleo a republic, wa• preaumed to be navtral in the Yemen conflict. Ho 
date waa announced for the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen. 
However, Egypt waa willing to withdraw aa early aa po•aible. The three­
nation coanittee wa• alao responaible for the auparviaion of a plebiscite, 
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which was to be taken once a ceaae fire was declared and honored . The 
reaaon faiaal did not ineiat on a preacribe4 date of the withdrawal of 
the Egyptian army in Yemen was probably becauae "Faiaal is leas worried 
about Naeaer and the UAR than he i• about Russian and Algerian penetra• 
tion of Yemen. Algerian aircraft have been eeen by neutral observer• 
in that country and Preaident Houri Boumedienne. who atayed away from 
the IChartoum meeting, wanta to eupplant Naaser •• the number one figure 
in the Arab World. u22 
The �hartowa agreement waa not welcomed by Sallal, and he pro· 
teated that the agreement vaa arranged over bis head. 23 Therefore, when 
the peace mission arrived in Yemen, he refused to eee them. The Royalist s ,  
on their part , had misgiving• over the Egyptian intentioaa. They felt 
that Kaeser was not about to leave Yemen, just aa he did not do ao in 
1962 after the United State• recognized the Republic, in 196l, after 
the United Nations diaengagement plan, and in 196S, after the Jeddah 
agreesnent. According to them, Raaaer wae just etalling for time ao that 
he could recover from the defeat Iarael had inflicted on hi• nation. 24 
Beedle•• to eay, a cease fire agreement was declared in November, 1967 
after Sallal was deposed while on route to Moecov. 
The ceaaa fire did not last long. The aepublicana, fearing 
Saudi Arabian enmity. asked the Soviet Union for help. On November 24, 
1967, twenty•four Miga arrived in Yemen along with Soviet technicians. 
22s tanko Guldeacu, ''War and Peace in Yenan," Queens Quarterly, 
(AutUIDD , 1967) , PP• 483·484. 
23"over Their Head ,11 Economist, (October 14, 1967) , p .  145. 
24stanko Guldeacu, .Q!. Cit. , p. 484. 
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Thi• maneuver by the Republic heightened Royaliat fear•• and once again, 
the ceaae fire wae broken. Thia time. however, the Egyptian forces did 
not take part in the action. The Republican •TIDY had to defend it• 
areaa, and its forty pilote trained in the Soviet Union were aufficient 
to keep the Royali•t• at bay. 
By the aiddle of December, 1967, the Egyptian troopa pulled out 
of Yemen. By coincidence this occurred only ten day• after the Britieb 
troopa left Aden. The !gyptiana, like the Britiah, aot out in good 
order, but •• they left Hudeidah port, ualy battle• were being fought 
between Royalieta and Republic.an•. The fighting continued becauae Mr. 
Noaa n, probably the moat flexible of the Republican•, resigned. He 
atepped down becauae he wanted to negotiate through the three-nation peace 
COllllllittee appointed by the Arab leadera at Khartoum. Hie place waa taken 
over by General Amri, who waa not willing to abide by the decis ion of the 
Khartoum agreement to hold a national plebiacite. 25 Nevertheleaa, the 
Yemen dileuma can be said to have ended a• an international conflict pit· 
t ing the traditionaliat Arabs against the revolutioniata. As aoon aa the 
laat Egyptian aoldier left Yeme.n, the Yemeni conflict became, in all 
practical purpose•. a civil war. 
The overthrow of Sallal gave Yemen the opportunity to aeek peace , 
but the &epublican government rejected the chance. The reaiguation of 
Romaan made any form of compromi1e between the Iloyalieta and the 
Republican• i.llpoaaible. The new government resiated the tripartite 
COIIllliaaion and rejected any form of negotiations either direct or indirect 
2.S"On Their OWD•·And Fighting, "  Economist, (December 16, 1967) , 
p. 1135. 
61 
with the Hamid Eddin Family. It took a dogmatic and unflinching ttand 
to uphold the inte&rity of the Republic. 26 Thi• uncompromisin& position 
by the new government forced the Royalbts to mobilize under PTiuce 
Mohammed. 
With the Egyptian army out of Yemen, the Royali•t• oelieved that 
the time had &rTived for them to march into Sana. On December 8 .  1967, 
Prince }ibh8J11Ded wae reported to have given the Republicans forty hours 
to surrender Sana. 27 It waa alao reported that foreign mi••ionariee were 
being evacuated from the city and that a curfew was illlpoeed ou the town. 
Along with theee reports came the mo•t dieturbing new• item from the be· 
leaguered Yemen. A Ruaaian Kig- 17 fighter wae ahot down over Royali•t 
territory and a Ru••ian pilot was captured. Thia alarming new• wa• 
aubatantiated by the United State• State Department, and made Saudi 
Arabia feel uncomfortable about the Soviet presence in Yemen. Thia was 
the only incident in the Yemeni conflict in which a non•Arab government 
personnel was captured by either of the two antagonist•. Saudi Arabia 
had cut off all military and financial aids to the Royalists by November, 
thereby observing the terma of the Khartoum agreement. But while it 
obeerved the agreement, the Soviet Union, who had not been a party to 
the agreement, wae replacing the United Arab Republic ' •  military help 
to the Republican regime. Thi• led raieal to announce oo January 4th 
that he would re•ume military help to the Royalists if the Soviet Union 
did not halt its support of the Republic. 28 As for the Republican forces, 
26oana A. Schmidt , Yemen: The Unknown !!!• p. 295. 
27"1.oyalieta Give Yemeni Regime 40 Houra to Surrender Sana, "  
!!! 12!! Time!, (December 8 ,  1967) , p .  C3. 
28 Dana A. Schmidt._Qp. , C.!£..:., p. 297. 
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they defended Sana with confidence and zest. San. had been under siege 
ever since early December, and many had assumed that the Republican 
government would collapee once the Egyptian forcea were withdrawn. On 
the contrary, the Republic waa showing new vitality and demonstrated 
that it can stand on it• own feet given the necessary material and 
economic aid. In the meantime , the Royalists were running out of 
supplies, and the failure of the Royalist forces in taking Sana had 
been assigned to their poor logietical support . S ince they had no air-
planes fer ·delivering arms , supplies or men to the arena of combat . they 
had to rely on foot transport and the use of animals. The harehnea1 and 
severity of the terrain• did not make matters any easier. Time was most 
important. The siege could not last for long because it drained the 
resources and tried the patience of the Royalist force•. The Royalist 
tribes were aDXious to atorm the city, so that they could return victo-
rious to their farms and homes. Because the Royaliat financial and 
military help waa cut off, inevitably, after a month of siege, the 
offeneive collapsed. 
On February , 1968, Saudi Arabia resumed ita support of the 
Royalists. However, the siege of Sana had failed, and the offensive had 
fizzled. Nevertheless, the aid was needed. According to Faiaal ,  Saudi 
Arabia could not stand by while the Republican regime waa being assisted 
by the Russians and lately by the Syriana. 29 It seemed that Paiaal was 
being compelled to reauae his support of the Royalist•. The initiative 
of the Royalist offensive waned , and the Royalist family scattered. 
2911Faisal to Reaume Help to Yemenie , "  New York Times , 
(February 29 ,  1968) , p. AS. 
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Al•Badr aat awaiting in Taif. Saudi Arabia, while other princes went to 
Beirut, London, and Germany. 
In 1968 the Republican governaent conaolidated it• poaition in 
Yemen, attempting to bri.Jlg dissident tribe• under it• control. With the 
help of Rueaian economic and military asaiatanee and with the waning of 
Boyaliat resistance, the Republic was meeting with aucceea. -However , 
much to the dialike of the Soviet Union, the Republican re.giae lk>Ught to 
reaume better relation• with the West. They feared the leftiat •leeents 
in the government and the army, who were, they suspected, plotting to 
overthrow the government . The Republicans bad juat recently witne�aed 
the takeover of South Yemen by the leftist NLF, and they were appre• 
he11 ive that a leftist coup d ' etat may envelope them. Therefore, the 
government began to proaecute auapected lef tista and moved closer to 
eatabliahing better relatioft• with the Weit. While Egypt , Syria, Iraq, 
and South Yemen recogni�ed Eaat Germany in Auguat , 1968 , the Yemeni 
llepub lic, on the other hand , gave it• recognition to West Germany, 
hoping auch action would lead to extensive West Gel"IDan aid. lo The 
Republic waa anxious to approach the United State• in order to form 
better relations with it. 
In the meantime , the Royalist• had decided to deprive Imam al• 
Badr of all powers and leave him aa a mere figurehead . Thay had aleo 
begun, with the help of Saudi Arabia, to prepare for another offenai•e 
against the llepublic. Under General Amri, t:he llepublic underwent a 
reorganization of ita ar� and prepared itself for the offenaive. But 
30"After Years of Civil War, Yemen Seelll8 to be at Peace , "  
_!!! � _T_ima_.._a, (August 4 ,  1968) , p. 18M. 
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when the offenaive started , it was not strong enough to achieve any 
significant results. A military stalemate then enaued . and by November , 
1968, the Royaliats were split severely. Al-Badr did not recognize the 
Royalist government ae constituted in June of the aame year. The June 
conference decided to form a new six-man Ima.mate Council with Prince 
Mohammed aa its head. Ke waa also named coanander-in-chief of all 
armed forces. The powers of al-Badr were taken away from him. Upon 
his rejection of the June conference, al-Badr declared himself Foreign 
Minister and Premier of the Royalist government. The split nearly 
destroyed the Royalist reaistence. Prince Mohammed, foreseeing the 
danger of the split, reaigned the post of head of the Imamate Council so 
that disunity in the ranka of the Royalists might be averted. But this 
split so shattered the prestige and influence of the Royalists that they 
were unable to rally anti-Republican elements into a fighting force as on 
previous occasions. Their disappearance ae a formidable force brought 
relative peace and harmony into Yemen. The Republic, ae a moderate 
government , could now decide on the future of Yemen. S ince the wounds 
of the war have not healed as of yet, it is inconceivable that a 
Republican Yemen can last without it• earnest attempt• to heal the wounds. 
This can only be done by the inclusion of Royalists into the government 
and into the affairs of Yemen. The suffering of Yemen has been long and 
tragic. Now that outside interventions have withered away, the Republic 
of Yemen needs to permit the return of Yemeni refugees ,  who had fled the 
country to save their life and fight for what they considered legitamacy. 
More than 100,000 Yemeni lives were lost during the conflict. Indeed, 
that is too high a figure for Yemen to forget, unless poaitive measures 
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are taken to insure a better and more prosperoue future for all Yemenis. 
C H  A P T  E R VI 
C O B C L U S I O N  
CONCWS ION 
The Yemeni Civil War was a teating ground for outaide forces 
of conflicting ideologies. On the one hand , stood Egypt , whose plat· 
form of Arab Socialism marked it as the apotheosis of Arab revolutionaries 
and progreasiv.iam. Its function was to help the Yemen Republic maintain 
itself and to eradicate the remnants of the past. On the other hand , stood 
Saudi Arabia, whose adherence to Islamic laws and traditions forced it to 
come to the defense of the Imamate dynasty and the statue quo. Saudi 
Arabia, as well as Great Britain, Jordan, and Iran shared a dislike for 
Nasser ' s  progreasiviat ·tendencies, while the revolutionary regimes in the 
Arab world gave their unresolved support of Egyptian incursions into Yemen. 
The power game brought the conflicting forces into direct physical conflict 
because Egypt ' s  military intervention forced the issue. 
Why did Nasser undertake the responsibility of sending his troops 
into Yemen? The answer is too difficult to postulate. But there are 
several reasons which are aub1tantive and conclusive. First, Nasser ' s  
venture into Yemen may have been influenced by his strong belief in 
securing a pan·Arab nation under the direction and guidance of Cairo. 
He had long recognized the importance of the peninsula geographically and 
economically. In his book, '.l"he Philosophy � !h.! Revolution, he asserted 
that the Arab land occupies an important strategic position in the map of 
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the world and it ia a croaaroada of the world. l It ia also a land, be 
contended , rich in oil, "oil which is considered the backbone of 
material civilization, and without which all the world ' •  largest facto-
riea, all means of land, aea and air c0111DUnication, all war weapons , be 
they fighter• and bomber• flying high above the cloud• or the submarines 
diving deep into the unfathomable depths of the oceana , would become 
mere iron b locka , devoid of motive power."2 Because the Arab world 
posaeaaee vast .-ount• of oil, it ia "etrong--atrong not through wailing, 
ahouting or appealing for help at the top of our voicea, but atrong 
through our compoaure, or our correct estimation, aupported by figures , 
of our capacity to work, aad our true uuderatanding of the strength of 
tie• that bind our people• together, those tie• which .ake our homeland 
aa integral and indivisible whole, which ahould be defended aa aucb and 
not aa an isolated unit. " 3  
Nasser'• recognition o f  the economic and a•ographic atrength of 
the Arab world led him to rebuke thoae regiaee attached and dependent 
upou the "1.aperialbta" nation• for capital and know•how. He ached to 
aee hierarchi81D and the dependency on foreign capital diaaipate, hence, 
his continuoue verbal attack• in the 1950 ' •  and 1960 ' •  on thoae ariato• 
cratic regiaea in the Arab world. The Yemeni revolution, henceforth, 
afforded him the opportunity to coae to the aid of a fellow revolutionary 
regime and atem the tide of reaiatance to it. 
1cwl Abdel Nasser, I!!! Philo1ophy 21, !h! Revolution, 
(Rational Publi•hina Bouse Presa, 1963), p. 66. 
21bid. ,  pp. 66-67. 
3Ibid. > p. 68. 
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In Yemen he came face to face with traditionali•t Saudi Arabia 
mid colonialiat Great Britain. Here hi• atrategy of destroying 
colonialiem and atriviog to eliminate traditionaliam in the Arab 
peninsula wat initiated. 
The mainteaance of the Yemeni Republic wae Ra•eer ' •  ae.cond 
reaaon fot bis venture. It waa important be.cauae , once the life of the 
Republic waa achieved , Naaaer ' a  attention could awing north and South. 
Be could then manipulate the overthrow of the Saud Family in Saudi Arabia, 
and by fermenting riot a.ad rebellion in Aden he could make the Britiah look 
for a haaty exit from its colonial posseasion. Strategically, he would 
become the power in the peain•ula, and thia would enable him to aerve as 
the rallying point to ouat American and British investment• in the area. 
Jirat, however, the Royali•t• had to be annihilated. When they did not 
auccomb gently, be resorted to the uae of poison gae. Saudi Arab ia ' •  
reaiatance to hia acheme frustrated his plaua. Nevertheleaa, time, aa he 
viewed i t ,  waa on hia aide. Moderniam waa making inroad• into the penin­
aula. He wae willing to stay ae long aa posaible. Military setbacks 
were only temporary. The easence of the matter wae his presence in Yemen. 
A• long as hie force• were there, the element• of "reaction" and colonial-
1 .. would eventually be de•troyed. Therefore, while Egypt wa1 forced to 
agree to attend neaotiating conferences after lllilitary reverie• , it did ao 
to graap at a chance to regroup ita force• and reeuae it• atrategy to kill, 
capture, or expell the Imam and end Royalist reaiatance. Hi• agreements 
to diaengage from Yemen were aade reluctantly. Hi• preatige and the 
integrity of hie poaition could not be comp�Olllised by either military 
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eetback• in Yemen or political preaeures from the United State• and the 
United Nation•. Be justified hie presence in Yemen as a moral duty made 
by Egypt to a sister-Arab nation. 
Saudi Arabia, by neceesity, adopted a defeneive posture against 
Egyptian military intervention in Yemen. Its military and economic 
a1si1tance to the Royali•t• were sufficient to stifle the Egyptian inter• 
vention. Even Faisa l ' s  attempt to create an Islamic alignment was 
defensive in essence. Its failure to emerge was due to lack of enthusi­
asm on the part of conservative Moslem regimes he visited for a confron­
tation with Nasser. 
The virtual destruction of the Egyptian armed forces in June, 
1967 by Israel made it impossible for Nasser to maintain his expeditionary 
force in Yemen. This is the turning point of the conflict. However, the 
vacuum left by hie forces was filled by the Soviet Union, whoae military 
and economic assistance to the Republic made possible the preservation of 
the Repub lican regime. This regime now demonstrated it could withstand 
the Royalists on it• own . It had matured. 
In retrospect, the Egyptian military intervention in Yemen was 
a success in its limited goals. The British forces were forced to 
evacuate from Aden and the Protectorate under strong opposition fro� the 
Nationalist Adanese, the Republic was maintained, the Royalists dissipated, 
and Saudi Arabia reformed its political, economic , and social institutions . 
However, in perspective, Egypt has failed to destroy traditionalism and 
rid the peninsula of its dependence on foreign capital. Saudi Arabia is 
a reformed society, but one which still funct ions under Islamic laws and 
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traditions. But, the balance of power had, once again, been 1wung in 
favor of the revolutionary regime1. 
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